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The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 
(MDTA) began a new era for labor market-related research 
by authorizing specific sums of federal money for research 
on the nation's employment and training problems. The 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act continued 
that practice, and the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982 
(JTPA) declares that the goal of the act is:
Sec. 221. (a) To assist the Nation in expanding 
work opportunities and assuring access to those op 
portunities for all who desire it, the Secretary shall 
establish a comprehensive program of employment 
and training research utilizing the methods, tech 
niques, and knowledge of the behavioral and social 
sciences and such other methods, techniques, and 
knowledge as will aid in the solution of the 
Nation's employment and training problems.
The use of the limited research and development (R&D) 
funds has been carefully planned and monitored, and the 
returns in policy improvement have been impressive. Never 
theless, this long-standing, high-payoff program, which is 
administered by the Department of Labor's Employment 
and Training Administration (ETA), appears about to be 
sacrificed on the altar of misplaced economy. Hence, it 
seems timely to review the nature and results of the program 
and identify those components especially worthy of saving.
Illustrative Contributions of ETA's 
Research, Development, and Evaluation Program
ETA's research, demonstration, and evaluation (RD&E) 
program played an important role in changing the direction 
of the MDTA shortly after it was passed. The original 
legislation was enacted in response to the belief that automa 
tion was the major cause of unemployment during the 1960s. 
The Act directed the Department of Labor to provide train 
ing and retraining to persons with fairly strong attachments 
to the labor force whose skills had become obsolete as a 
result of technological changes.
Some of the earliest research supported under the MDTA 
suggested that automation was playing only a limited role in 
explaining the extent and nature of unemployment during 
the mid-1960s. The researchers clarified the problem of 
unemployment by directing the attention of policymakers to 
the growing number of disadvantaged workers who were 
jobless (i.e., minorities, women, youth, the uneducated and 
unskilled) and needed training and retraining to become 
employable. Those findings contributed to a redirection of 
policy, which has prevailed to this day. The finding that 
training applicants could not be successfully trained by ex 
isting methods because they could not read or write led to the 
addition of basic literacy courses to the program. When 
research showed that training programs were being inun 
dated with inexperienced, jobless young school dropouts 
who were not eligible for training—the first wave of the baby 
boom—the rules were changed to enlarge the youth compo 
nent. When other findings suggested that a high program 
dropout rate was related to inadequate stipends because 
many trainees could not afford to remain in programs, 
amendments were passed to augment those allowances.
Even as the emphasis changed to the disadvantaged, 
policymakers failed to realize that those services alone might
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not solve deep-rooted and pervasive problems, such as 
discrimination, the inability to read or write, inadequate 
labor market information, poor motivation, and insufficient 
market demand. The complexity of the social and economic 
problems faced by unemployed workers was brought to the 
attention of policymakers and the general public by the 
research, experimental and development program.
The findings of the RD&E program suggested that the 
assignment given to federal agencies to move unemployed 
workers into jobs was far more difficult to achieve than had 
been assumed in the early 1960s.
Social scientists supported under ETA's research program 
gave early warnings during the 1960s and the 1970s that pro 
found changes were taking place in society that would affect 
women's participation in the labor force. They identified the 
growing divorce and separation rates, the increase in infants 
born to women without husbands, and the women's libera 
tion movement as significant factors that would increase the 
number of women heading families who would be entering 
the labor force. Again, the research results were utilized for 
policy purposes, as reflected in new amendments to employ 
ment and training legislation and the design of new training 
programs for women who head families.
The labor market problems faced by minority workers 
were given special attention under ETA's social science 
research program. One significant study documented 
discriminatory practices that prevented minority enrollment 
in apprenticeship programs. The study also found that 
because minority youths have no relatives or other adult 
models in the skilled trades, they know very little about the 
apprenticeship system and how to enter it. In response, ETA 
funded an action-oriented organization to assist minority 
workers in learning about the apprenticeship system and 
prepare them for apprenticeship examinations. These efforts
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generated by the research are largely responsible for tripling 
the proportion of minority workers in apprenticeship pro 
grams between 1967 and 1980.
Long term support was provided to Columbia University's 
Conservation of Human Resources. The Columbia resear 
chers were among the first to identify the role of government 
and other nonprofit institutions in economic growth. They 
also examined the impacts of the growing service-oriented 
sector and the effect of employers' policies on the employ 
ment experience of noncollege-trained young workers. A 
series of studies of the health industry correctly anticipated 
the rapid employment growth in the health field; these find 
ings were used by program operators in selecting growth oc 
cupations for government-sponsored training of 
unemployed workers. Several examinations conducted by 
the Columbia group of the experience of other countries in 
dealing with training disadvantaged workers also helped to 
shape U.S. legislation and policies during the 1970s.
Early on, it became clear that progress in labor market 
research was being hampered by the lack of qualified re 
searchers interested in the field. To develop research 
capabilities, ETA provided research support for over 500 
doctoral candidates between 1962 and 1980 to induce young 
scholars to devote their talents to the study of employment 
and training problems. A conscious effort was made to bring 
new interdisciplinary skills into a field that had previously 
been limited largely to labor economists. The conclusions of 
many researchers funded by ETA indicated that employment 
and training problems transcended economics. Many of the 
scholars supported under this program are now employed in 
universities, private industry, foundations, government, and 
research organizations.
Mindful of the operational responsibilities, the managers 
of the RD&E program did not shrink from the independent
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evaluation of the agency's activities. They funded 
assessments of the Neighborhood Youth Corps (NYC), the 
Job Corps, and the Employment Service. An intragency 
committee consisting of departmental program officials and 
the research office developed research objectives for improv 
ing the services provided by the Labor Department. Research 
findings from these projects led to the creation of new NYC 
delivery models for rural youth and an employment service 
that was more responsive to the needs of the country's disad- 
vantaged workers.
Research also saved money. The RD&E office helped 
design experimental and developmental models to pretest 
programs before they were introduced as large scale social 
programs. Coaching, outreach, and job development efforts 
had their origins in experimental and developmental pro 
jects. The experimental tests also prevented policymakers 
from embarking on impractical training approaches.
ETA research administrators were often able to persuade 
other federal agencies to underwrite experimental and 
demonstration projects. An example is the Supported Work 
project, which was cofunded by the National Institute on 
Drug Abuse, the Department of Justice, the Department of 
Health and Human Services and the Ford Foundation. This 
demonstration research project, which served 10,000 par 
ticipants, was designed to develop a work alternative to 
welfare for persons often considered unemployable because 
of their antisocial behavioral patterns. Ex-offenders, ex- 
addicts, welfare heads of household, and unemployed, out- 
of-school youth were provided with work experiences for 
about a year, under close supervision and in a work situation 
associated with a crew of peers.
The Supported Work project indicated that diverse ser 
vices were most effective in preparing women who had been 
long term welfare recipients for the world of work. The ser-
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vices also had an impact on a significant segment of the ex- 
addict population, but little effect on ex-offenders and the 
youth group. Although the major findings of the project 
have not been applied on a larger scale because of reduced 
federal funding for employment and training programs, 
several cities have adopted the model, and social service 
agencies have implemented projects for mentally retarded 
youth based on the findings of the Supported Work project.
In addition to mission- and problem-oriented research, the 
administrators of ETA's research program recognized that 
some social research requires a long term investment to il 
luminate complex economic and social developments. 
Therefore, in response to limitations of cross-sectional data 
that provide a snapshot of how workers fare in labor 
markets, ETA launched the National Longitudinal Survey 
(NLS) of labor market experience. Data were collected on 
the employment, unemployment, mobility, and other labor 
market experiences of a national sample of youth, middle- 
aged, and preretirement mature workers at various critical 
stages of their working lives. The NLS has provided insights 
into how, when, and why socioeconomic problems arise and 
has given scholars and policymakers important tools for 
determining future labor market decisions of workers. In 
1979 a new cohort project was started which focused on 
disadvantaged youths and provided a follow-up of young 
persons who entered the armed forces.
The NLS is probably the most important data set that has 
ever been collected about American workers. The research 
findings have had important impacts on policy decisions and 
have affected the design of employment and training pro 
grams. For example, the NLS shows that lack of vocational 
guidance and vocational information handicaps young 
blacks in their job search efforts. NLS findings have 
repeatedly documented the effect of sex and race discrimina 
tion on women and minority workers. The data have shown
that mature black women who are heads of one-parent 
families are among the most disadvantaged persons in our 
society. Hundreds of scholars have also used the unique in 
formation base of the NLS in studying the movement of 
workers into and out of the labor market.
The trend toward early retirement is confirmed by the 
NLS. The data indicate that, contrary to popular belief, the 
majority of men retire voluntarily, and only a small propor 
tion are forced out of their jobs because of mandatory retire 
ment; more than a third retire because of poor health. If 
funding continues, the NLS data will eventually be the na 
tion's most significant source of information about mature 
working women as they approach retirement age.
Many of the NLS findings suggest that conventional 
employment and training approaches have not taken into ac 
count that many labor market disadvantages appear to 
originate in a long term developmental process that begins in 
the home. Values, attitudes toward work, family respon 
sibilities, parental models, divorces and separations, sex role 
norms, age of marriage, and education and income of 
parents all seem to affect future labor market experiences. If 
the information from the NLS were applied, our human 
resource policies would call for training programs that place 
greater emphasis on preventing labor market disadvantages 
from developing at an early stage in an individual's life.
Managing the RD&E Program
In conducting a pioneering federal social science research 
program, the administrators of ETA had to design a pro 
curement system that was equitable to those seeking research 
support, attract the most qualified personnel, and develop a 
staff capable of initiating, processing, and monitoring pro 
jects that could help ETA achieve its objectives. To comple 
ment those goals, the RD&E office encouraged the submis-
xi
sion of unsolicited proposals, but it also initiated a com 
petitive request for proposals (RFP). Originally, owing to 
funding limitations, greater reliance was placed on un 
solicited proposals that came primarily from the academic 
community. When the RD&E budget was increased, ex 
perimental and demonstration projects were undertaken and 
more use was made of RFPs, which elicited proposals from 
entrepreneurial or consulting organizations.
An effort was made to maintain a balance between un 
solicited proposals and RFPs in order to attract academically 
based scholars, who were more likely to question the 
premises on which programs and practices were based, and 
specialists employed in consulting firms who could apply 
their operational knowledge to experimental and develop 
ment projects. Departmental staff, specialists employed in 
other federal agencies, and outside experts reviewed and 
assessed the proposals.
ETA offered academicians temporary fellowships to work 
in RD&E. These academicians became a valuable resource 
when they returned to their universities. Many of them con 
tributed to policy-oriented research and assisted in for 
mulating research issues and evaluating RD&E projects.
Dissemination and Utilization 
of Research Findings
Censorship is a recurrent problem in federal agencies that 
sponsor social science research. Findings of research or ex 
perimental and development projects often question conven 
tional wisdom or challenge the effectiveness of programs. 
Agency administrators often are not interested in publishing 
information that may be critical of programs they originated 
or manage.
Administrators of RD&E programs have had to protect 
the right of researchers to freely express conclusions based
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on their studies. They also play an important role in pro 
viding communication links between the research communi 
ty and the potential users of research findings. ETA has 
published and disseminated research reports that were used 
in the policymaking process. A conscientious effort was 
made to translate the jargon of some social scientists so that 
research findings could be understood and used by a wide 
audience of policymakers and the general public.
Threats to Employment and Training Research
Over the past two decades, the National Council on 
Employment Policy has carefully assessed the RD&E pro 
grams that have been conducted by the Department of 
Labor's Employment and Training Administration. The 
Council has concluded that the products of ETA's social 
science research programs have played an important role in 
shaping and formulating national policy on employment and 
training issues.
We are therefore deeply concerned that the program is 
now facing the most devastating threats in its 20 years of 
productive existence. Funding has been cut from a modest 
1980 level of $13.0 million to only $6.1 million for 1984. An 
excessive reliance on formal RFPs may encourage research 
that represents the preconceptions of politically appointed 
administrators, precluding innovative proposals based on 
the insights of objective observers. The doctoral dissertation 
program has been cancelled, cutting off the flow of new 
researchers. Policymakers and the general public of the mid- 
and late-1980s will not have access to the information needed 
to assess the effectiveness of the Job Training Partnership 
Act; such information can only be gleaned from the findings 
of academic-based researchers and the experts employed in 
consulting firms.
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The recent discontinuance of the ETA Office of Research 
and Development's utilization and dissemination activities 
has created a serious vacuum in the knowledge base about 
the new direction of policy on employment and training 
issues.
The situation is not limited to the Department of Labor. 
During the 1980-1984 period, when outlays for total research 
rose by more than 40 percent, expenditures for the social 
sciences were curtailed by about 18 percent. Although 
federal outlays for all social programs have been increasing 
rapidly, only 3 percent, or $432 million, was allocated to 
social science research in 1984. 1 The funding for social 
research is small in comparison with the cost of supporting 
the hard sciences and miniscule compared to the cost of 
operating the government's social programs. The federal 
government can only assure the nation that it is making a 
wise investment in social programs if it provides support for 
a social science research that is commensurate with operating 
programs.
Policy Recommendations
1. Federal support for ETA's RD&E programs should be
r r\j»nHpH nnt HprrpncpHexpanded, ot decreased.
The new Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA) is ex 
perimenting with a new and relatively untested delivery 
system that places greater emphasis on private-sector in 
itiatives and cooperation in delivering services to 
economically disadvantaged and displaced workers. The ad 
ministrators of the JTPA, Congress, and the public need
1. Federal support for the social sciences is largely centered in four agencies that provide 
almost three-fourths of these funds. The 1984 obligations of these agencies were as follows: 
the Department of Health and Human Services, $142.4 million; the Department of 
Agriculture, $92.5 million; the Department of Education, $38.4 million; and the National 
Science Foundation, $34.8 million.
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reliable and objective information about this new delivery 
system. Increased support should be given to social science 
research and small-scale experimental and development pro 
jects so that their findings can help in assessing the effec 
tiveness of the JTPA. The research products of carefully 
designed experimental projects should raise the level of 
debate about the usefulness and contributions of employ 
ment, training, and other social welfare programs.
2. The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS), a basic na 
tional data source that supplies the country with unique in 
formation about the labor market experience of our 
workforce, should be given full and continuous funding.
Longitudinal surveys cannot be subject to inconsistent, in 
termittent, and inadequate appropriations. Respondents will 
be lost and the immediacy of the data will not be maintained 
if long term and sustained funding is not provided.
3. ETA's doctoral dissertation program should be revived 
and maintained.
The dissertation program has made a major contribution 
to human resource development by enabling hundreds of 
young scholars to be trained for work in the field of employ 
ment and training. Most of these young professionals have 
maintained their interest in programs designed to train or 
retrain economically disadvantaged workers. ETA's relative 
ly small investment in the dissertation program has had a 
lasting effect on the supply of social researchers from dif 
ferent social science disciplines.
4. The dissemination and utilization of RD&E findings 
based on studies of employment and training programs 
should be continued and encouraged.
Dissemination and unlimited access to the findings of 
government-sponsored social research reflect intellectual 
freedom in a society dedicated to democratic principles.
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ETA should revive its dissemination and utilization program 
so that its RD&E findings will enable policymakers in the ex 
ecutive branch and Congress, as well as the general public, to 
make informed decisions about employment and training 
programs.
The acquisition of information about social and economic 
problems must be a public concern in a democracy. Govern 
ments cannot be effective and responsive without knowledge 
generated by social science research. The findings of social 
research can illuminate the complex issues facing our society 
and assist in avoiding some of the consequences of our major 
economic and social problems.
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FOREWORD
In reflecting on the 1960s and 1970s, many researchers 
have acknowledged the truly dramatic and substantive 
changes that occurred in American society in regard to the 
role and status of minorities, women and the disadvantaged. 
It is not an exaggeration to conclude that the changes con 
stituted a social revolution that has greatly enhanced the 
American dream of recognizing the dignity and worth of 
every human being. Central to this set of changes was the 
recognition that access to the American dream was gained 
largely through jobs and income as deprived individuals 
gained the required training and work opportunities.
The federal legislative initiatives of the 1960s included a 
requirement that research explore in greater depth the prob 
lems being addressed and that evaluation be made of the new 
programs in employment and training. Program demonstra 
tions and experiments were a natural addition to re 
quirements for research and evaluation. Thus, research, 
demonstration, and evaluation became integral tools for 
designing new social policy.
The focus of these proceedings is limited to a review of the 
programs conducted by the Office of Policy, Evaluation and 
Research in the Department of Labor's Employment and 
Training Administration. The National Council on Employ 
ment Policy, at its January 1984 meetings, devoted the better 
part of two days to reviewing the past, examining present 
policy, and developing modest recommendations for present 
and future policy. The policy statement reflects the thoughts 
and conclusions of the Council on the contributions of 20 
years of research, demonstration, and evaluation efforts of 
the Employment and Training Administration of the U.S. 
Department of Labor.
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To aid in its review, the Council commissioned four 
papers by persons who have played central roles in the 
development and management of the research, demonstra 
tion, and evaluation programs. The reflections of Dr. Eli 
Ginzberg are especially instructive because of his dual role as 
researcher and adviser to Presidents, Secretaries of Labor, 
and the Congress over a period of more than three decades. 
Dr. Ginzberg's paper is a model for all activist scholars who 
venture to bridge the two worlds of academic scholarship 
and public policy activism. Dr. Ginzberg examines the 
research, demonstration, and evaluation contributions to ex 
panding and improving (a) the number and quality of re 
searchers, (b) the data base, and (c) the methodology of 
research. His central conclusion is that the program was 
"highly successful" despite the limitations of the academic 
environment on which it depended for success.
A review of the 20-year period would also be incomplete 
without a contribution from Dr. Howard Rosen, who was 
the central figure within the Department of Labor in shaping 
and managing the research, demonstration, and evaluation 
program. He argues that the development of a successful 
research, demonstration, and evaluation program is possible 
within a mission-oriented agency only if it is able to 
demonstrate the usefulness of its findings. He further 
documents his view that, even with modest resources, it is 
possible to have a major impact upon the interests and work 
of the social science research community. He also claims that 
significant policy changes were made in laws, regulations, 
and the management of programs as a result of the more 
than 2,000 studies completed with research, demonstration, 
and evaluation funding.
A paper by Dr. Gary Burtless and Dr. Robert H. 
Haveman summarizes the lessons learned from three major 
labor market experimentation programs conducted in the 
United States. The Seattle-Denver income maintenance ex-
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periment tested the impact of a negative income tax plan on 
the labor market activity of some 4,800 families over a 
period of three to five years. The National Supported Work 
Program was designed to provide one year of work ex 
perience to persons with severe employment problems. The 
Employment Opportunity Pilot Project was a guaranteed 
jobs program to be tested at 14 sites throughout the United 
States. The authors conclude that while much was learned 
from the three programs, such experiments may not be the 
way to demonstrate the usefulness of basic policy proposals.
In the final paper in this volume, Dr. Daniel Saks suggests 
a research agenda for employment and training policy in the 
1980s. He notes the recent decline in funding for research 
and focuses attention on issues regarding the organization 
and administration of a research program.
Collectively these papers and the policy statement provide 
a much needed review of what has gone on over the past 20 
years in employment and training research. It is hoped that 
the volume will stimulate and encourage research, 
demonstration, and program evaluation efforts in the 
future. For some observers of the current scene, the success 
of the social revolution of the 1960s and 1970s in expanding 
employment opportunities for minorities, women, and the 
disadvantaged is by no means complete. While research, 
demonstration, and evaluation have made an enormous con 
tribution to knowledge and policy, the task, the challenge, 
and the opportunity continue even though federal financial 
support is dwindling to the point where the existence of a 
meaningful program is in doubt.
R. Thayne Robson, Chairman 
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When asked to take on this assignment, I immediately 
responded in the affirmative since my colleagues and I at the 
Conservation of Human Resources (CHR), Columbia 
University, have been major beneficiaries of DOL funding 
throughout the two decades. Clearly our beneficiary status 
necessitates that this special relationship be acknowledged, 
but it did not justify my turning down the invitation. Except 
for the most recent generation of manpower researchers, all 
who have worked in the field of human resources and man 
power had been beneficiaries of DOL, some more, some less.
*Anna Dutka, a long-time member of the Conservation staff who has assisted me on many 
earlier projects, was most helpful on the present assignment. She found many of the critical 
items that I have reviewed; she checked a great many details with informed persons inside 
and outside of the federal government; she made sure that text and footnotes were aligned; 
and she took over responsibility of turning my draft manuscript into final product. For all 
of this assistance, and more, I am deeply in her debt.
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2 Expanding the Knowledge Base
My solution to this conflict of interest is relatively simple: 
I will not deal with the multiple research products that the 
Conservation of Human Resources produced beyond calling 
the reader's attention to the brief descriptive summary that 
can be found in Research and Development: A 16-Year 
Compendium (1963-78) (hereinafter cited as Compendium); 
The Conservation of Human Resources Project: Fortieth 
Anniversary Report, Columbia University, March 1979; and 
a listing and brief notation of the principal CHR research 
supported by DOL appended to this paper.
Let me further note that because of various governmental 
and nongovernmental positions, I had other interlocking 
relationships with the Department of Labor's Office of 
Research and Development (ORD), in particular, as Chair 
man, National Commission for Employment Policy and as 
Chairman of the Board, Manpower Demonstration and 
Research Corporation.
The above helps to make the record clear. But I should 
also add that I have had a long and close friendship with 
Howard Rosen, the long term director of ORD.
2. Orientation
The above potential sources of conflicts of interest having 
been specified, it is desirable, if not essential, that I touch at 
least briefly on a number of intellectual and emotional 
predispositions that have long helped to shape my thinking 
about research in human resources and manpower as well as 
in the broader arena of social investigations.
As a pupil of Wesley Clair Mitchell and John Maurice 
Clark, I come out of the "institutional school of economics" 
with deep skepticism about the applicability of mainline 
economics as an explanatory theory of the U.S. and world 
economies. My skepticism has been that much greater when
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it comes to applying neoclassical economics to the analysis of 
human resources and the labor market. 1
Further, I am in fundamental disagreement with the 
positivistic tradition of the Chicago School, which believes 
that economics is a "value-free" discipline and that the 
results of the researcher are totally independent of his 
political orientation. Aristotle taught that man is a political 
animal. Hence he can engage in value-free social inquiries 
only if he were able to think and reflect outside of his own 
skin. But I cannot conceive of such a disembodied re 
searcher. 2
Let me call attention to a few more preconceptions and 
prejudices. While money, especially large amounts of 
money, can, over a period of years, alter a research environ 
ment by increasing the number of trained researchers, a 
significant transformation requires considerable time. Even 
when successful, as in the case of biomedical research which 
saw federal expenditures increase from about $65 million in 
1950 to about $4 billion in 1984, the much enlarged research 
establishment may make very slow progress in solving com 
plex problems such as understanding the causative factors in 
cancer.
Further, the institutional reinforcement that established 
doctrines and techniques receive from the academic leader 
ship does not yield ground readily—not even in the presence 
of new, large, and sustained research and development ex 
penditures. The reasons are not difficult to appreciate: most 
good researchers are interested in an academic career and 
have the best prospects of success if they conform at least to 
the extent where their seniors and peers publish their articles 
and vote to grant them tenure.
Reformulated, the foregoing implies that a federal 
research and development program is inevitably and to a 
large degree the captive of the academic establishment.
4 Expanding the Knowledge Base
Many will say this is as it should be; but moral imperatives 
aside, this is how it has been and will probably long continue 
to be.
Federal research funds are made available by Congress 
with the Administration playing a leading or, at a minimum, 
a supporting role. Hence there is no possible way for a 
federal research and development program to get under way 
and flourish unless those concerned with its growth and well- 
being keep, at all times, not one but two ears to the ground. 
Skillful research administrators must make a large number 
of compromises on both the administrative and the 
legislative fronts if a continuing dollar flow is to be secured. 
They are most successful if they know where they want to go 
and succeed in moving ahead with only an occasional detour.
Finally, one must recognize that the most important ad 
vances in the natural and the social sciences are the work of 
men of genius. 3 By definition, not even the best planned, 
financed and executed research and development program 
has learned how to increase the number of geniuses. All that 
it can accomplish is to improve the methods, the data, the 
personnel and the environment which may sooner or later 
lead to a major breakthrough that will advance the 
discipline.
3. Criteria and Overview
The results of an assessment of a research and develop 
ment program depend on the criteria employed. If the 
criterion is a major intellectual breakthrough, the odds are 
overwhelming, for the reasons just adumbrated, that the 
evaluation will be negative.
What other, more reasonable criteria, might be used to 
assess a research and development program? Three have 
already been alluded to in passing: the enlargement of the
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research pool, the improvement in the data base, and the 
development of new, as well as the reinforcement of existing, 
methodologies. In the assessment that follows, we will start 
by making use of each of these three criteria.
One can begin this assessment by noting that ORD, 
through its dissertational grant program, 4 enlarged the pool 
of young researchers by an order of magnitude. During the 
16-year period under review, it added almost 500 new doc 
torates to the pool.
A second major accomplishment of ORD was its signifi 
cant strengthening of the data base. Most of the 2000 or so 
grants and contracts which it funded yielded some new data 
about some facet or facets of the labor market. But ORD 
made its largest single commitment, beginning in 1965, to 
improve the data base by funding the National Longitudinal 
Surveys at Ohio State.
On the third front, the development of new methodology, 
ORD moved circumspectly. It was cognizant of a division of 
labor between itself and the National Science Foundation, 
whose charter gave the latter more scope to support research 
aimed at the development and refinement of theories and 
techniques. On the other hand, Congress encouraged ORD 
to undertake evaluative studies of manpower programs and 
in the process considerable advances in evaluation techni 
ques were achieved. One must add, however, that many 
evaluations contributed little if anything to improved results, 
substantive or methodological.
The single most useful volume that deals with the ORD 
program is a collection of papers contributed by Ray Mar 
shall, Denis Johnston, Michael Piore, Glen Cain, Peter 
Barth, Vernon Briggs and Herbert Parnes under the editor 
ship of Gordon Swanson and Jon Michaelson. 5 These papers 
were prepared for the Committee on Department of Labor 
Manpower Research and Development of the National
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Academy of Science, chaired by Gordon Swanson, that had 
undertaken a review of the ORD program and published its 
report in the mid-1970s under the title Knowledge and Policy 
in Manpower. 6
Peter Earth, in his contributed paper, calls attention to 
several ways in which a review of research can be approach 
ed: concentration on the subject areas that have received at 
tention; assessment of the quality of the research; determina 
tion of the existence of patterns; evaluation of the timeliness 
of the research and its relevance to policy formulation; the 
cost/benefit ratio involved; and finally, the possibilities for 
improvement. 7
There is surely nothing wrong with the above listing and 
Earth recognized that additional criteria could easily be add 
ed. From among this large number I will select only two to 
add to the three criteria noted earlier for the purposes of this 
assessment—the quality of the research and its contribution 
to program development and policy.
A first approximation suggests that many of the 2000 pro 
jects were of good quality—the subject was sensible, the data 
collection and the analyses were carried out in a 
workmanlike fashion, and the findings made some contribu 
tion to the program or policy. The best among them made 
multiple contributions.
With respect to the relation of ORD results to public 
policy, a presumptive conclusion is that Congress must have 
given the program at least a passing mark because of its will 
ingness to keep funding it.
By way of recapitulation, the following five criteria have 
been identified as central to the assessment to which this 
paper is dedicated:
— The enlargement of the research pool.
— The improvement of the data base.
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— The development of new methodology.
— The quality of the research projects.
— The contribution to public policy.
4. Labor Economics: A Longer View
By way of setting it is important, especially for the orienta 
tion of the younger members of the profession, to call atten 
tion to the state of "labor economics" (to use the most in 
clusive term that was earlier in vogue) that distinguished the 
American academic scene prior to the passage of the Man 
power Development and Training Act in 1962.
What follows is based largely on memory and personal ex 
perience, sharpened by a rereading of the materials referred 
to in this assessment. It also clearly shows some of my pre 
judices and preferences.
The leaders of labor economics in the 1950s—John 
Dunlop, Charles Myers, Frederick Harbison, and Clark 
Kerr, the first three of whom were charter members of the 
National Council for Employment Policy and also served as 
chairmen of the Council in its formative years—were busy 
studying the impact of industrialization on labor, primarily 
in the developing nations. Without resorting to 
psychohistory, a reasonable presumption is that they found 
overseas a more exciting research arena than the United 
States during the Eisenhower era of goodwill during which 
management and unions were getting along and the prob 
lems of the poor, the blacks, and women had not yet risen to 
a high level of consciousness.
In the mid-1950s, when the National Manpower Council 
put the subject of "womanpower" on its agenda of possible 
areas for future investigation, the vote in favor of pursuing 
the inquiry passed by a single vote! When the final report 
Womanpower6 was presented to President Eisenhower he
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remarked: "Oh yes, women were very important in the 
European Theater of Operations; they did very good work as 
telephone operators, chauffeurs, and nurses"!
At about the same time, one of the more literate members 
of the New York banking community was unable to com 
prehend what was meant by the term "human resources" 
until he was informed that it was a broader term for the 
arena usually subsumed under military and civilian man 
power. In fact, when Frederick Harbison relocated from the 
University of Chicago to Princeton he made a detour via 
New York to learn about the range of subjects that the Con 
servation of Human Resources Project at Columbia was 
working on.
In late 1953, shortly after James P. Mitchell, one of my 
favorites among the sixteen Secretaries of Labor with whom 
I have consulted, as appointed, he designated an informal 
5-man advisory committee to assist him in reorienting the 
Department of Labor. Douglas V. Brown of Princeton serv 
ed as informal chairman and Kerr and I were members, 
together with Cy Ching and a Washington consultant. Our 
principal recommendation was that the Department of 
Labor should become the manpower agency of the federal 
government. Mitchell was comfortable with this recommen 
dation but there was very little that he could do in the 1950s 
to implement it.
Two more observations. The majority of academicians in 
terested in labor economics were based at, or closely aligned 
with, industrial relations institutions located at a few of the 
major private universities but primarily at the principal state 
universities of which Cornell, Michigan, Michigan State, Il 
linois, Minnesota, and California, both at Berkeley and at 
Los Angeles, were among the leaders.
An inspection of the contents of the Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review in the early 1960s discloses that most of the
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issue was given over to a symposium on "Industrial Rela 
tions in Latin America." 9 The other three principal articles 
dealt with "Fringe Benefits and Overtime as Barriers to Ex 
panding Employment," "Labor Relations in the Postal Ser 
vice" and "The Relation of the Labor Force to Employ 
ment." None of the articles made use of a single regression; 
they relied on descriptive statistics—nothing more.
Much the same was true for the first issue of the Journal 
of Human Resources which appeared in the summer of 
1966. 10 Of the five principal articles on investing in human 
capital, the supply of and demand for college teachers, oc 
cupational data requirements for education planning, the ef 
fects of general education on manpower programs, and the 
economics of health, education and welfare, not one made 
use of econometrics or mathematical modeling.
So much for the status of labor economics in academe at 
the onset of ORD. How did the breakthrough in federal 
manpower policy, including research funding, occur? The 
successful political initiative owed much to the work and 
findings of two committees in the House and the Senate 
under Representative Elmer Holland and Senator Joseph 
Clark, both of Pennsylvania, during 1960 and 1961. The 
committee hearings called attention to the growing incidence 
and prevalence of unemployment. Curtis Aller and Garth 
Mangum did yeoman service as staff directors of the House 
and Senate committees, respectively. It is worth recalling 
that the Republicans played a major role in passing the 
MDTA legislation.
Further, Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois had worked long 
and hard to obtain federal assistance for depressed areas and 
the Area Redevelopment Act was finally passed and signed 
in 1961 by President Kennedy.
Senator Clark, shortly after the election of President Ken 
nedy, asked me to assemble a group of academicians and
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other experts for a meeting with him at the Harvard Club in 
New York City to explore a Congressional manpower in 
itiative. Arthur Goldberg was one of the invitees, but had to 
cancel at the last moment because the President announced 
his appointment as Secretary of Labor. Among the major 
recommendations that the group made to Senator Clark was 
to include in any new legislation a requirement that the Presi 
dent submit an annual report on manpower to the Congress 
which would help to focus the attention of the nation on the 
subject. Further, the group recommended Congress provide 
funding for a research and development program.
One more piece of history. Seymour Wolfbein who had 
been assigned by Secretary Mitchell and reassigned by 
Secretary Goldberg a leading role in the Department of 
Labor's emerging manpower efforts, asked me to talk with 
the Secretary while the Manpower Development and Train 
ing bill was making its way through Congress about the need 
for a job creation program to accompany a job training pro 
gram. The Secretary heard me out, indicated that he agreed, 
but added that the White House would go for a modest train 
ing bill and nothing more.
5. Assessment
The basis for the appraisals offered below requires 
clarification. I did not read, much less study with care, the 
2000 or so completed research investigations. Some of the 
reports emerging from the more important research efforts 
were known to me since they first were made public and I 
have sought to refresh my memory about those that I con 
sidered relevant for the present exercise. Further, I turned 
the pages and read most of the text in the Compendium and 
reviewed with some care the two publications of the National 
Academy of Sciences. As noted earlier, I also did some 
sampling of the journals to refresh my memory of their
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scope and coverage at the beginning and end of the period 
under consideration.
With this preamble, the assessment of ORD's program in 
terms of the five criteria that were earlier identified can pro 
ceed.
The Enlargement of the Research Pool
There is good reason to believe that in the absence of 
ORD's liberal funding for manpower studies, the principal 
centers of research in labor economics—the industrial rela 
tions centers identified above—would have continued surely 
for a long time in their accustomed ways, allocating most of 
their resources to problems of collective bargaining and 
closely related issues. In fact, even in the presence of multi 
ple sources of funding, including not only ORD but also 
other federal agencies such as the National Science Founda 
tion, National Institutes of Health, and the Departments of 
Commerce and HEW, to note only the more important, the 
industrial relations centers moved slowly and haltingly to 
shift the focus of their research interests towards human 
resources and manpower. A few moved energetically, but 
most took only small steps.
ORD, faced with this relatively inflexible research struc 
ture, moved to institution building, part of the aim of which 
was to strengthen the research pool by making a series of 
"institutional grants." 11 Most of the grants were funded for 
a period of between four and five years with a total of four 
rounds of awards between 1966 and 1978. 12 The funds pro 
vided for modest staff expansion, some scholarships, cur 
riculum building, and some research support. The last two 
rounds shifted the program's focus from teaching and 
research to professional training for CETA staff in the 
several regions of the country.
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A total of just under 50 institutional grants were made. An 
early and continuing target was to assist the curricula 
development of minority-based colleges and universities so 
that they could provide broadened opportunities for their 
students to qualify for careers in employment and training. 13 
An inspection of the list of grantee institutions suggests that, 
aside from the considerable number of minority-based in 
stitutions, about ten to a dozen represented universities that 
had demonstrated a sustained high level of research capabili 
ty in labor economics and/or employment and training.
By far the most exciting undertaking in the arena of 
research resource development was the Doctoral Dissertation 
Grants program. Almost 500 of these, completed and in pro 
cess, are listed in the Compendium. 14 Three publications 
prepared by Lawrence Klein, formerly of the Department of 
Labor, who relocated to the University of Arizona, provide a 
window into those dissertations that were judged to have the 
most merit in terms of the quality of the research and the 
relevance of the findings. 15
Among the unique characteristics of the dissertational 
support program was the fact that ORD encouraged students 
from all of the social sciences to apply, and that the selection 
committee of outside experts responded by allocating 
roughly one-half of the grants to economists and the balance 
to other social scientists from anthropology to demography.
The best way to indicate the quality of the grantees is to 
list those with whose work I am reasonably well acquainted 
who appear on the first 14 pages (10 percent) of the total 
listing: Lawrence S. Seidman, Gilbert Cardenas, Gregory 
DeFreitas, Lionel J. Hausman, Marjorie H. Honig, Michael 
Boskin, Robert D. Reischauer, Jonathan R. Kesselman, 
Robert J. Flanagan, Stephan T. Marston, Harvey S. Rosen. 
If the foregoing ratio were to hold throughout, it would 
mean that this one appraiser would have a more or less in 
timate acquaintance with the work of about one-fifth of the
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entire group—no small visibility considering that a con 
siderable number of researchers at the time that the Compen 
dium was published had not yet completed their projects.
Faced with a gross shortage of manpower researchers, 
ORD responded quickly and with imagination to remedy this 
most serious of bottlenecks. By establishing the Doctoral 
Dissertational Grants program in 1965 and by opening it up 
to all social science students who had completed their work 
for a doctorate, other than writing their dissertation, ORD 
made a major contribution by both attracting high talent in 
to the manpower arena and at the same time broadening the 
boundaries of the field by encouraging applicants from all of 
the social sciences.
The Institutional Grants program was more of a mixed 
bag, largely because of strong pressure from the 
policymakers to direct much or most of the money to objec 
tives other than the advancement of manpower research. I 
don't want to convey the impression that the institutional 
grants made no contribution to the furtherance of research, 
only that their contribution was relatively minor. It should 
also be noted that ORD, had it been free to design the pro 
gram according to its own preferences, would probably have 
spent a large proportion of the total funds at the nation's 
strongest academic centers with a demonstrated capability to 
undertake significant manpower research. But that option 
was not available.
Improving the Data Base
This is the second criterion that we earlier identified to 
guide us in this appraisal of ORD's program. As Clark Kerr 
recently remarked in "The Intellectual Role of the 
Neorealists in Labor Economics," one of the long-term con 
tributions of those who focused their attention on the opera 
tions of labor and labor markets has been to improve and 
correct the faulty assumptions and conclusions of the
14 Expanding the Knowledge Base
economic theorists about how labor markets operate. 16 In 
fact Wassily Leontief, in his sharp and insightful presidential 
address to the American Economic Association, took note of 
the continuing misallocation of the resources between data 
gathering and model construction with the disproportionate 
emphasis on the latter. 17
In the mid-1960s, when Daniel Patrick Moynihan was 
Assistant Secretary of Labor, he and the director of ORD 
took the initiative to devote a considerable proportion of the 
then quite modest research budget into a long term effort to 
improve the data base by funding the National Longitudinal 
Surveys of Labor Force Behavior (NLS) at The Ohio State 
University under the leadership of Professor Herbert S. 
Parnes in association with the Demographic Survey Division 
of the Bureau of the Census.
The NLS study has focused attention on four 
groups—older men, middle-aged women, and young people, 
both male and female. In 1979 it added a new and enlarged 
youth cohort. Its informational net has been cast wide to in 
clude a host of variables, including economic, sociological 
and psychological, in order to permit study of the interac 
tions among the principal forces that determine outcomes of 
different groups in the labor market. The NLS deliberately 
oversampled for minorities. From the outset, a unique aspect 
of the surveys was the frequent reinterviewing of the same in 
dividuals.
The Compendium lists the large number of studies of 
labor force behavior that derive directly from the NLS. 18 In 
her assessment of the NLS, June O'Neill of the Urban In 
stitute singled out for special attention three research areas 
where the Surveys yielded much valuable new insight: 
Unemployment and Related Labor Market Issues; Women's 
Labor Force Participation and Male-Female Earnings Dif 
ferentials; and Aging and the Retired. 19
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While Parties and his many associates at Ohio State took 
the lead in analyzing the rich materials that the Sureys were 
yielding, ORD arranged along the line that the research com 
munity would have easy and low cost access to the tapes. 
Once again, I resorted to a sampling approach to call atten 
tion to some of the analysts who, under ORD grants, made 
use of the Survey data: D.H. Nafziger, J.L. Holland, Robert 
E. Hall, Jacob Mincer, Herman P. Miller, Robert J. 
Flanagan, Ernst Stromsdorfer. 20
Those wise in the ways of the Washington bureaucracy 
and the halls of Congress will appreciate that the launching 
of the NLS was not easy. There is always a strong resistance 
to spending governmental funds on data collection. But even 
more difficult is to keep a project such as the NLS going. 
Next year will mark its twentieth birthday, a remarkably 
long life for such an effort. As the editors of Manpower 
Research and Labor Economics remarked in their introduc 
tory note to Herbert Parnes' article: "The National 
Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) constitute a unique research ef 
fort in the manpower field; indeed this study is a landmark in 
the social sciences as a whole during the past decade." 21 
Parnes, with his customary modesty, concluded his interim 
assessment with the comment, "There is, of course, no way 
of determining whether the National Longitudinal Surveys 
have been worth the millions of dollars they have cost." 22
Under the single heading of "Labor Demand," the Com 
pendium lists over 100 projects that ORD funded, many of 
which had as their primary or secondary aim the improve 
ment of the data base. 23 While no one project, nor possibly 
the entire group, can approach the NLS, they underscore the 
sensitivity of ORD to improving the data sources available to 
researchers. In this connection, one must not overlook the 
useful appendices prepared by ORD that appear at the end 
of the annual Manpower Report of the President, later 
renamed the Employment and Training Report of the Presi 
dent. The tables therein reproduced and brought up to date
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every year have undoubtedly saved researchers untold hours 
in gaining access to current data on which they depend so 
heavily.
The Development of New Methodology
As noted in section 3, when this subject was first address 
ed, ORD sought not to get too involved in funding projects 
the principal aim of which was to develop new methodology. 
Despite its self-imposed restraint, one can still identify a 
commendable contribution that ORD made to the improve 
ment of methodology even though such gains were often 
closely related to data improvement, program design and 
policy clarification. In the Index of Research Subjects in the 
Compendium one finds about 50 titles under 
"Methodology" including the following important areas: 
accuracy in manpower projections; America's uncounted 
people; cost-benefit analysis of manpower programs; income 
dynamics of the poor; internal labor markets; job vacancies 
in the firm and the labor market; methods of forecasting 
short-term unemployment change; occupations—meanings 
and measures; short-term manpower projection methods; 
and working life tables for the U.S. 24 This one listing under 
"Methodology" in no way provides an overview of the full 
scope of ORD's efforts in this area. About the same number 
of titles are found under "Assessment and Evaluation."
Once again, a useful approach to the quality of these in 
vestigations is suggested by noting the names of some of the 
researchers and the investigations that they pursued: Robert 
E. Hall explored the Keynesian dichotomy between frictional 
and involuntary unemployment in periods of full employ 
ment; 25 R.A. Gordon, Michael L. Wachter and Karl E. 
Taeuber prepared papers on demographic trends and full 
employment; 26 Michael J. Boskin explored a model of oc 
cupational choice based on the theory of human capital and 
estimated by conditional logit analysis; 27 Charles C. Holt 
and his associates at the Urban Institute carried on extensive
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studies of job search and labor turnover dynamics in order to 
gain a better understanding of employment in an infla 
tionary era; 28 Richard A. Easterlin studied long swings in 
labor force growth; 29 Stanley Lebergott sought to develop 
new methods of forecasting short term unemployment 
changes; 30 James G. Scoville addressed conceptual and 
measurement problems in occupational analyses; 31 and Orley 
Ashenfelter investigated the use of various econometric 
models to assess the impacts of training. 32
Imbedded in sections 1 and 2 of the Compendium one 
finds methodological contributions from other leading 
economists and social scientists including: Finis Welch and 
Marvin Kosters; Laurits R. Christensen and Dale N. 
Jorgensen; Lawrence R. Klein; Phoebus Dhrymes; Lester C. 
Thurow; Edward D. Kalachek and many more with a na 
tional and international reputation. 33
By far the largest single financial commitment of ORD to 
the improvement of methodology was its liberal multiyear 
funding of the Manpower Research and Demonstration Cor 
poration evaluation effort carried out under the title of 
"Supported Work," with Mathematica as the prime con 
tractor and the Poverty Institute at the University of Wiscon 
sin as the major subcontractor. The cost of the research, 
which was based on random assignment of clients with ex 
perimental and control groups and involved baseline inter 
views and multiyear follow-up interviews, approximated 11 
million dollars. 34
ORD was distressed that with so many billions being in 
vested in training programs, definitive answers as to whether 
or not they made a difference in terms of postemployment 
and earnings experience were hard to produce. Moreover, it 
was even more uncertain whether such programs could help 
the most disadvantaged groups in the population. Hence its 
willingness to spend a large sum on a well-designed research 
design that would be properly implemented and where the 
results could command respect.
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The results turned out to be mixed: the AFDC mothers 
group definitely showed large benefits from work; the results 
for the ex-addicts were equivocal; and there were no gains 
for the ex-of fenders and youth. I was restive from the outset 
about the high cost of this evaluation but my colleagues con 
vinced me of the value of a scientific evaluation. I also recall 
Robert Lampman's warning that the null hypothesis would 
probably be sustained.
Before concluding this section on methodology, I would 
like to add a few observations. I believe that ORD was cor 
rect in not undertaking heavy financing of methodological 
inquiries. Had it done so, the odds are strong that it would 
have added substantially to its ongoing difficulties of sus 
taining support for its research program both within the 
Department of Labor and in the Congress. Further I suspect 
that many of the most important methodological advances in 
the manpower arena, as in other fields of inquiry, are often 
the by-products of investigations directed at substantive 
goals.
It made sense for both the Congress and the Administra 
tion to become interested in evaluating the results of various 
programmatic interventions to assist the unemployed and 
other disadvantaged groups. But this belated interest, which 
blossomed with the passage of CETA in 1973, led to the ex 
plosive growth of for-profit firms, many of which were 
located in the Washington area, which became highly adept 
at pressuring the various federal agencies, including the 
Department of Labor, for evaluation contracts. For the most 
part, the programs had not been designed and implemented 
in terms of participant selection, data collection, controls, 
output measures and follow-up to yield meaningful results 
when formal evaluation techniques were applied. As sections 
4D and 4E in the Compendium make clear, ORD was suc 
cessful through 1978 in not bending very far in the direction 
of this new enthusiasm. 35 When the new Administration
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came into office in 1981, however, evaluations became a 
favorite of the policymakers in the Department of Labor.
One of the opportunities for learning more about the par 
ticipants of various training programs that in my view was 
largely neglected was to tap into Social Security records for 
follow-up information. Admittedly, access to Social Security 
records is hard to come by, especially for research purposes; 
the matching process is difficult and the limited amount of 
follow-up information will constrain what can be learned. 
Still, it represents perhaps the least expensive way to get a 
fast reading on the effectiveness of large public investments 
in employment and training programs.
My direct experience with specially designed evaluation 
programs such as "Supported Work" has impressed me with 
their cost. On the other hand, attempts to economize, as in 
the case of the Youth Entitlement Program (Manpower 
Research and Development Corporation and Abt 
Associates), by reliance on a matching of so-called "com 
parable cities" such as Baltimore and Cleveland, can turn 
out to have many disadvantages.
The Quality of the Research Projects
If one were to single out just one, rather than five criteria 
with which to assess ORD's program, my preference would 
be to use "the quality of the research projects." As I have in 
dicated earlier, good research in the social arena will, more 
often than not, have a policy orientation and in the process 
the researcher will often contribute to enlarging the data base 
and score an advance over existing methodology. According 
ly, many of the projects that are referred to below, as well as 
many previously discussed, could without distortion be plac 
ed in other categories since as with all systems of categoriza 
tion, but particularly with the one that we are following, a 
large element of arbitrariness cannot be avoided.
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About half of the pages of the Compendium are directed 
to listing and briefly discussing the research projects under 
two principal headings: 1. The Economics, Social and Policy 
Background; and 2. The Labor Market. Sections 3 and 4 
deal more specifically with training and administration. In 
the pages that follow I will comment solely on research pro 
jects listed in sections 1 and 2.
There is no possible way for me, without excessive 
elaboration, to take note of all the research work that war 
rants attention because the investigator addressed an impor 
tant subject; he or she dealt with it according to accepted 
research canons, and the results make a contribution both to 
the pool of knowledge and to public policy.
My selections aim rather to provide the reader an overview 
of the range of support that ORD provided and the impor 
tant subjects that the research illuminated. In the very first 
year, 1963, Margaret S. Gordon studied the European ex 
perience with employment and training, thereby providing 
U.S. officials with a road map. 36 Benjamin Shimberg and his 
colleagues undertook pioneering work in the arena of oc 
cupational licensing. 37 David S. North and Marion F. Hous- 
toun produced an important exploratory study of the 
characteristics and role of illegal aliens in the U.S. labor 
market. 38 Frank Levy and his colleagues Clair B. Vickery 
and Michael L. Wiseman contributed significant new 
knowledge and understanding to the income dynamics of the 
poor. 39
Lester C. Thurow's book on Generating Inequality was 
the outgrowth of a research project in which he explored the 
concept of job competition in contrast to the neoclassical 
wage competition model of the labor market. 40
The final stage of T. Aldrich Finegan's and William G. 
Bowen's classic study of labor force participation rates was 
supported by ORD. 41
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Richard B. Freeman's basic research on engineers and 
scientists in an industrial economy which led to his well- 
known work, The Overeducated American, grew out of 
ORD support. 42
John T. Dunlop and Daniel Quinn Mills had a series of 
grants which enabled them to assess in depth the changing 
capacity of the construction industry to adapt to changing 
labor requirements and to modify their training systems ac 
cordingly. 43
Louis E. Davis of the University of California, Los 
Angeles, the father of the Quality of Work Life in the United 
States, received early support from ORD which also provid 
ed considerable support for the Human Interaction Research 
Institute (Los Angeles) as well as for the work of Stanley 
Seashore and his colleagues at the Survey Research Center at 
the University of Michigan, all of which resulted in a con 
siderable number of interesting publications. 44
Sheppard and Belitsky's study, The Job Hunt, published 
in the mid-1960s represented a departure. They explored 
more broadly than earlier researchers the motivational and 
attitudinal dimensions via a case approach of how 
unemployed workers look for jobs. 45 This effort reaffirmed 
the wisdom of ORD's broader approach to labor market 
processes than was characteristic of most economists.
A quite different approach, more ambitious and with 
more far-reaching results, was carried out over a five-year 
period (1968-73) by F. Ray Marshall of the University of 
Texas at Austin in his study Negro Employment in the 
South. Six southern cities were the focus of this inquiry: 
Atlanta, Birmingham, Houston, Louisville, Memphis and 
Miami. Important findings emerged from analysis of the fac 
tors that contributed to a lowering of the barriers against 
black workers. At the same time, the research pointed to ma-
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jor difficulties that continued to handicap blacks both at the 
point of being hired and also in advancing up the job 
ladder. 46
Cynthia Fuchs Epstein of Columbia University explored 
the factors that hinder or facilitate women's entrance into 
such prestigious professions as law, medicine, science, and 
academe. The author noted that the early socialization pro 
cess of girls and young women as well as later institutionaliz 
ed barriers acted to reduce the potential supply. Her analysis 
and findings led to a major book entitled Women's Place: 
Options and Limits in Professional Careers. 41
The foregoing selections are illustrative of the large 
number of important research projects supported by ORD 
which covered a wide range of critical policy areas and yield 
ed important new knowledge about the operations of the 
labor market. The outstanding accomplishment of the 
research program, surely in terms of intellectual impact and 
long term influence, was the work of Peter B. Doeringer and 
Michael Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower 
Analysis, which was started in 1966 and completed in 1970. 48
The data that the authors used to study the operations of 
manufacturing firms in adjusting to imbalances in labor sup 
ply and technological changes were derived from an earlier 
project that had also been funded by ORD. The authors 
stressed the dynamics of freedom that medium-sized and 
large employers have and exercise in making adjustments in 
their labor supply through hiring, screening, training, 
recruitment, and subcontracting, relying on these ap 
proaches much more than on wage adjustments to assure 
themselves of the range of workers and skills that they re 
quire.
The authors also concluded that disadvantaged members 
of the labor force, minorities and women, found it very dif 
ficult to break into the sector of stable, internal labor
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markets and were therefore crowded into the "secondary" 
labor market characterized by short term, low-skill, low- 
paying jobs which in turn had a major impact on the ways in 
which such disadvantaged groups adjust to work and life. 
The authors concluded that these disadvantaged groups live 
on the periphery of the labor market and society and have lit 
tle opportunity to join the mainstream. Hence the term, "the 
dual labor market."
In the Brookings Papers, Michael L. Wachter undertook a 
43-page critique of what he subtitled the "Dual Approach," 
which was followed by comments and discussion including 
remarks by Piore. 49 In Wachter's analysis, the dual labor 
market approach is predicted on the following: differences in 
firm behavior in the high and low wage sectors; a distinction 
between good and bad jobs, not between skilled and unskill 
ed workers; and movement of workers in the secondary 
labor market among low wage jobs and between unemploy 
ment and labor force participation.
Wachter concluded that it is wrong to assume that the in 
ternal labor market in the primary sector does not follow the 
employer's search for efficiency and that it is wrong to dif 
ferentiate sharply between the primary and secondary 
markets since mobility exists between them. Further, per 
vasive underemployment need not be the key characteristic 
of the secondary labor market. But Wachter is not all 
negative: he believes that the dual labor market theorists 
have made significant contributions in focusing on wage- 
setting behavior in the secondary market; in introducing 
feedback effects into their model; and in deepening 
understanding of the unemployment mechanism. Each is im 
portant and the three together represent a major advance.
In a recent contribution to the Discussion Paper Series of 
the Harvard Institute of Economic Research, "Troubled 
Workers in the Labor Market," Richard B. Freeman con-
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eludes his review of the dual labor market hypothesis with 
the following comment: "In short, the dual market claim 
regarding wage determination processes appears to be valid, 
but its other assertions have yet to be shown to be empirically 
correct." 50 This is no small praise for a theory 14 years after 
it was first introduced and after it has been subjected to 
repeated and detailed critiques.
The ORD record of quality research projects would have 
to be assessed as respectable, if not outstanding, even 
without the Doeringer-Piore contribution. But its rating 
must be raised once one takes cognizance of the fact that it 
subsidized one of the few intellectual breakthroughs in the 
conceptualization of labor markets in the decades of the 
1960s and 1970s.
Contributions to Public Policy
Although we have noted in passing that many of the pro 
jects previously identified have had a direct or indirect im 
pact on manpower programs and policies, the investigations 
reviewed below have been selected specifically to emphasize 
this facet of ORD's total effort. The projects have been 
selected with an eye to illustrating the impact of ORD's pro 
jects on broad manpower policy as well as on specific pro 
grammatic improvements. Some fall in the zone between the 
two.
As far as broad policy considerations are concerned, one 
can identify projects that encouraged Congress to adopt new 
or more expansive stances with respect to public service 
employment, extended unemployment insurance, work-fare, 
improved articulation between remedial education and skill 
training, mobility allowances and upgrading efforts.
The research program also had significant beneficial ef 
fects on expanding apprenticeship opportunities for black 
men, on placing black women in the South in white-collar
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and technical positions with career opportunities, in helping 
ex-offenders to gain a permanent attachment to the labor 
market, in helping persuade the courts to permit young peo 
ple awaiting trial to participate in supervised work programs, 
in persuading the Department of Defense to modify its selec 
tion criteria so that a quarter of a million who, under 
previous standards, would have been rejected were accepted.
The following pages provide some elaboration of the 
foregoing. In the early 1970s, a series of University of 
California-based investigations focused on the Bay Area, in 
cluding one by Robert A. Gordon and Lloyd Ulman, con 
cluded that public service employment could be increased by 
10 to 15 percent in low-skilled categories without severe 
disruption or costly new inputs. 51 Later in the decade, the 
Urban Institute in Washington, under the direction of Lee 
Bawden, concluded that opportunities existed for 3 million 
public sector jobs in 21 program areas. 52 In the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, two ORD contracts with the National Civil 
Service League led to an estimate, based on summary data, 
that more than 400,000 yearly vacancies were available in 
state and local governments for the employment of disad- 
vantaged workers. 53
The foregoing, together with additional projects outlined 
in the Compendium under section 3G, "Providing Public 
Employment," 54 surely contributed to the decision of Presi 
dent Carter to request, and Congress to agree to, a vast in 
crease in PSE jobs in the latter years of the 1970s.
The carefully crafted and carried out study of unemploy 
ment insurance exhaustees by Mathematica in 1974-7655 con 
cluded, among other findings, that UI did not operate as a 
serious work disincentive and that even among many who 
withdrew from the labor force after their benefits were ex 
hausted, a significant proportion wanted to return to 
employment. These findings, among others, surely reinforc-
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ed the subsequent actions of the Congress to extend the 
periods of coverage, even in the face of budgetary stringen 
cies and the opposition of an Administration that sought to 
reduce income transfer payments.
The Minnesota Work Equity Program, which got under 
way in 1977, sought to test an alternative to income transfers 
for welfare clients by providing guaranteed work or training 
as alternatives. The principal components were an expansion 
of public service jobs at or near the minimum wage, expand 
ed training opportunities on the job or in the classroom, and 
placement of 10 percent of the clients into unsubsidized jobs. 
The lessons learned from this undertaking, evaluated by Abt 
Associates, surely encouraged President Reagan and the 
Congress to modify existing welfare legislation to encourage 
the states to experiment with work-fare. 56 Even without the 
benefit of any specific research findings, the Department of 
Labor early recognized (1963) that MDTA had to be amend 
ed to enable many of the unemployed to undergo a remedial 
educational experience before entering upon occupational 
training. If my memory is correct, the Director of ORD was 
alerted to this need on the basis of his trips to the field during 
the early months of the training program. In any event, the 
Congress agreed with this assessment.
The most successful linkage between remedial education 
and skill training occurred at Job Corps Centers, but only a 
small number of disadvantaged youth profited from the ex 
perience. In 1977, Congress, in passing the Youth Employ 
ment and Training Program, specifically reserved some part 
of the total funds, 22 percent, for use by the educational 
authorities to encourage them to improve their efforts at 
remedial instruction, especially for out-of-school youth who 
were returning to school to take advantage of the program. 
ORD did not make more than an occasional grant for 
remedial education. Again, if my memory serves me correct 
ly, this was viewed as the domaim of HEW.
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In the case of "Facilitating Geographic Mobility," the 
Congress acted first (1965), directing the Department of 
Labor to mount efforts to assist unemployed and 
underemployed workers to relocate to areas where there are 
more and better jobs available.
Demonstration mobility projects were launched in 28 
states and a total of 14,000 workers were relocated. 57 The 
Employment Service undertook a major 3-year effort, begin 
ning in 1969, to assist farm migrants based in South Texas to 
settle out of the migrating stream. Abt Associates undertook 
the assessment and published a 4-volume report. 58
The relatively modest number of workers who were suc 
cessfully relocated (many who made a successful move later 
returned home) and the formidable difficulties encountered 
in diverting settlement out of the migrating stream appeared 
to me at the time, and also now in retrospect, to explain why 
Congress never moved in a big way to subsidize worker 
mobility. Politics was an additional barrier. Congressmen 
from counties losing population do not readily vote funds to 
speed the outmigration of their constituents. The equivocal 
results from the demonstrations strengthened their opposi 
tion.
ORD, through contacts with Mobilization for Youth and 
Howard University in 1965 and 1966, focused on preparing 
disadvantaged youth for entrance into paraprofessional oc 
cupations with focus on jobs in health care. These early ef 
forts provided a favorable backdrop to Congressional action 
in 1967 when it passed the New Careers amendment. 
Thereafter ORD expanded its upgrading demonstration ef 
forts in all three sectors of the economy—private, nonprofit, 
government. 59 Among the most interesting and rewarding 
was its decade-long effort at the U.S. Atomic Energy Com 
mission plants at Oak Ridge where it succeeded in moving a 
considerable number of poorly educated local persons into
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skilled and technical jobs through carefully structured learn 
ing and on-the-job experiences. 60
The foregoing illustrations of the interface between 
ORD's projects and Congressional action do not "prove" 
that without the former, legislative action would not have 
occurred. All that this suggests is the probability of ORD's 
influence, both positive and occasionally negative (mobility), 
on Congressional action.
There is a presumption in the United States that the 
measure of influence on public policy is best revealed by 
Congressional action to pass new laws and make new ap 
propriations since by such actions Congress can affect all or 
a large part of the entire population. But clearly, as noted 
below, ORD had considerable policy impact other than 
through persuading Congress to act. We will inspect five 
more striking success stories.
F. Ray Marshall and Vernon M. Briggs, Jr. undertook in 
1966 and completed the following year a study of 10 major 
cities with large black populations aimed at assessing the bar 
riers blocking the entrance of blacks into apprenticeship. 
The more important recommendations emerging from this 
study are set out in the Compendium's abstract. 61 The 
critical point for this assessment is to be read in the striking 
gains in the numbers of minorities who succeeded in being 
accepted as trainees in subsequent years and the striking 
gains in the number of journeymen, at least in some, if not 
all, unions. Those who followed the lowering of the barriers 
have no question that the Marshall-Briggs study, The Negro 
and Apprenticeships, 62 served as the wedge that the leader 
ship in both the public and private sectors used to ac 
complish this striking advance.
The Minority Women Employment Program was another 
outstandingly successful effort of ORD. Based on an Atlanta 
pilot study of the early 1970s, the aim of the demonstration
Expanding the Knowledge Base 29
was to determine whether a specially targeted outreach effort 
could place college-educated minority women in nontradi- 
tional managerial, professional and technical occupations, 
primarily in the private sector. In addition to Atlanta, the 
program became operational in Dallas, New Orleans, Tulsa, 
Cincinnati and Los Angeles. The major steps in the program 
were to identify desirable openings, to coach and support 
likely candidates to increase their prospects of being hired 
and then to help them to retain their jobs. By 1978, five years 
into the program, over 1300 women had been placed, with 
many of them representing the first minority women ever 
hired into these higher level positions. 63
Starting in the very first year of MDTA, ORD focused 
considerable effort and resources in assisting prisoners and 
ex-offenders through a series of imaginative and often dif 
ficult and risky demonstrations. These involved gaining ap 
proval of the prison authorities to provide training for in 
mates by taking advantage of the 1966 amendments to 
MDTA which no longer limited eligible trainees to persons in 
the labor force. In the late 1960s, ORD funding enabled the 
Vera Institute in New York City to undertake two pioneering 
projects using pretrial interventions to provide persons under 
arrest and awaiting trial with training and employment op 
portunities. If the trainee's performance warranted, the pro 
ject staff recommended dismissal of the charges. 64
Still another, relatively late, effort was to provide transi 
tional financial aid to newly released prisoners to assist them 
in making it back in civilian society and into the world of 
work. At the time when the Compendium was being publish 
ed ORD had achieved some successes together, as one might 
have anticipated, with some failures. But it must not be 
overlooked that the resources available to ORD to help this 
large population were quite limited.
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The last impact study goes back to the earliest days of 
ORD—to 1964—when it carried out a study for the Presi 
dent's Task Force on Manpower Conservation focusing on 
youth disqualified for military service. 65 The Report recom 
mended that approximately one-third of all the young men 
turning 18 would, if examined, fail to qualify for induction 
into the Armed Forces for reasons of inadequate health or 
education. Most of the latter had been reared in poverty. The 
results of the study were used by the President to persuade 
Secretary of Defense McNamara to accept a large group 
(about 250,000 eventually) of below-standard men in the 
hope and expectation that through remedial assistance in the 
military they could be turned into effective servicemen. 
While the Pentagon was equivocal about the results, I reach 
ed a positive conclusion. 66
6. A Personal Summing Up
Now that my formal assessment has been completed, the 
reader is free to make his own judgment about how well 
ORD scores on the five criteria that have been used to review 
its progress over the 16-year period, 1963-78. I will add my 
own judgment at the very end, but not before I comment 
briefly on some critical factors that have not been introduced 
up to this point but which I believe must be considered 
before a balanced judgment can be made. The hitherto ex 
cluded considerations deal respectively with certain 
developments in both the academic and political en 
vironments, each of which helps to define the parameters for 
any large-scale governmental research and development pro 
gram in human resources and manpower.
To treat the academic issues first: most of the energy of 
academic economists since the university first captured the 
discipline has been directed to refining the intellectual corpus 
and perfecting successive techniques, the most recent being
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the dominance of mathematical model-building and 
econometrics. Progress in a social discipline surely depends 
in part on improvements in theory and advances in technique 
but it also depends on problem identification, data improve 
ment, and first approximations that yield new understanding 
and that can contribute to policy guidance. It is my judgment 
that because of the pedagogic imperatives of the university 
which involves training and testing of students, the former 
always predominates to the relative neglect of the latter.
To make matters worse, the more emphasis is placed on 
the demonstration of technical competence by students 
rather than on the reliance on their written work, the greater 
the gap between the discipline and the inchoate world of 
reality.
A few points of illumination. I recall Arthur F. Burns 
remarking to me in the early 1960s that in his opinion his col 
leagues in Fayerweather Hall (the then home of the Colum 
bia Economics Department) were off the wall since the 
curves which they put on the blackboard were used inter 
changeably to describe wages, prices, international trade, 
money and still other key variables.
In 1970 or 1971 the National Institute of Education asked 
a few consultants to discuss youth unemployment and what 
the schools might do to mitigate the curse. A Chicago 
economist, who later won the Nobel Prize, said "You know, 
Eli, all one has to do is wait. They'll grow out of it." I sug 
gested that some, perhaps many, might not since they would 
be the victims of homicide, become drug addicts, or spend 
years in prison.
In 1964 Gary Decker published Human Capital and within 
a relatively few years his approach had come to dominate the 
field of "labor economics" at most of the country's leading 
universities. All that one need do is to scan the journals from 
the late 1960s to the present. A never-ending stream of
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econometric exercises has emerged in which novitiates seek 
to measure the influence of one or more factors on the 
employment and/or wages and/or career progression of in 
dividuals with differing endowments and achievements.
No one will question that Decker opened up a powerful 
line of analysis but the value of the inquiries informed by his 
approach depends in no small measure on the quality of the 
extant data and in most cases the data vary from poor to very 
poor. The combination of econometrics coming into its own 
and the availability of the human capital model proved a 
powerful combination that left its mark on ORD in the 
1970s. In Glenn Cain's judgment it was all to the good, 67 but 
the editors of the Industrial and Labor Relations Review ac 
cording to their recent note to prospective authors appear to 
have developed some second thoughts. 68
It is an old question in new form—how much does one 
need to know about the institutional framework to make 
significant advances in understanding the operations of 
labor markets and the behavior of workers? I believe the 
answer is—a great deal.
But the world of academe has compounded the situation 
in still another respect. The dominance until recently of the 
neo-Keynesians with their reliance on a relatively small 
number of basic relationships to explain the level of ag 
gregate employment must be seen as another impediment to 
progress. And when the theory ran afoul of an accelerating 
inflation after 1965, the doctrines that sought to replace 
Keynes, a worsening Phillips' curve, the increase in the 
natural rate of unemployment, and the elaboration of ra 
tional expectations created an unseemly spectacle of an 
analytic engine out of control. And that is where the 
academy stands at the beginning of 1984.
As I look back to the early days of the New Deal I find 
four arenas of public policy issues in the manpower or-
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bit—unemployment, income for those who have no work or 
can't work, discrimination, and equality of career oppor 
tunity. This is my assessment of how well, or how poorly, we 
have done to cope.
With respect to unemployment the American public, as is 
so frequently the case, has not taken its own laws seriously 
and full employment is not high on the nation's agenda. I 
have found it irresponsible and cynical for a nation to insist 
that everybody, other than the sick, the injured and the 
elderly, take care of himself and his dependents and yet 
makes no serious effort to provide jobs for those who can't 
find an opening because there is a shortage of jobs.
We have done well in providing income for most of the 
elderly. Few remain in poverty once one takes in-kind 
transfers into account. With respect to single parents and 
their children even in states with relatively liberal payments, 
we know that money alone does not suffice. What is re 
quired, and how to intervene remain elusive. Here we need 
more knowledge.
Again in the case of discrimination, the record is 
equivocal. If one measures the progress of blacks from 1940, 
the gains have been appreciable; if the starting date is 1619, 
then progress has been abysmally slow. Many are fortunately 
joining the middle class; many others are regrettably still in a 
marginal role. Laws can help but full employment and white 
leadership are even more important.
With respect to expanding career opportunities for those 
from low income homes we have made good progress since 
1958 when the Congress passed the National Defense Educa 
tion Act. But the broadest opportunities are those providing 
for young people who are qualified to enter college. There is 
a group who never get properly educated in the basics 
without which most of them are doomed to a blighted 
future. We must get our public educational system to work
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better and it cannot do so all by itself. Improvements in the 
economy and in the country are also needed. Youngsters will 
make the effort to learn if they see some hope of benefiting. 
But such hope is absent for many who are brought up 
without a father, on welfare grants and are educated by 
teachers who fear or dislike them.
Some people believe that Congress has appropriated too 
much money in the past for these programs. My concern is 
different: our return per dollar expended has been relatively 
small and it is that issue which we must address.
Ours is a democracy and Congress' main task is to ap 
propriate money to help achieve federal objectives, but it is 
forced to rely primarily on lower levels of government and 
the private sector to transform the dollars which it ap 
propriates into useful goods and services. But the instrumen 
talities through which Congress is forced to work have their 
own objectives and priorities with the result that the efficien 
cy and efficacy of federal dollar outlays are greatly reduced. 
To complicate matters further, the political arena con 
tributes to an instability in administration, the dominance of 
an annual budgetary cycle, log-rolling in the halls of the 
Congress, and a calculus in which political gain is frequently 
at odds with program accomplishment.
We are now at the end. ORD in my view was on balance a 
highly successful effort. It must be adjudged that much more 
successful considering the sorry state of academe on which it 
was largely dependent for research proposals and for their 
implementation and on that unique American institution, 
the Congress, for financing, redesign and sustained support.
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Appendix
From my perspective, Conservation of Human Resources 
(CHR), Columbia University, made significant contribu 
tions in opening up or addressing the following lines of 
analysis: the pluralistic economy, producer services, health 
manpower, comparative manpower studies (Europe and 
Japan), metropolitanism and suburbanization, the labor 
market as an information system, labor market segmenta 
tion, measuring public output, professional women, regional 
econometric models, and the theory of human resources.
I am listing below some of the more important research 
projects carried out by CHR that were supported in whole or 
in part by ORD during the period 1963-78.
Dale L. Hiestand. Economic Growth and Employment 
Opportunities for Minorities (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1964).
Eli Ginzberg, Dale L. Hiestand, and Beatrice G. Reubens. 
The Pluralistic Economy (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1965).
James W. Kuhn. Scientific and Managerial Manpower 
in Nuclear Industry (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1966).
Harry I. Greenfield. Manpower and the Growth of Pro 
ducer Services (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1966).
Harry I. Greenfield with Carol Brown. Allied Health 
Manpower: Trends and Prospects (New York: Colum 
bia University Press, 1969).
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Dean Morse. The Peripheral Worker (New York: Colum 
bia University Press, 1969).
Eli Ginzberg with Miram Ostow. Men, Money, and 
Medicine (New York: Columbia University Press,
1969).
Beatrice G. Reubens. The Hard-to-Employ: European 
Programs (New York: Columbia University Press,
1970).
Thomas M. Stanback, Jr. and Richard Knight. The 
Metropolitan Economy: The Process of Employment 
Expansion (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1970).
Ivar E. Berg. Education and Jobs: The Great Training 
Robbery (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).
Dale L. Hiestand. Changing Careers After 35 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1971).
Charles Brecher. Upgrading Blue Collar and Service 
Workers (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972).
Ivar E. Berg (ed.). Human Resources and Economic Wel 
fare: Essays in Honor of Eli Ginzberg (New York: Co 
lumbia University Press, 1972).
Stanley Friedlander with Robert Shick. Unemployment in 
the Urban Core: An Analysis of 30 Cities with Policy 
Recommendations (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1972).
Boris Yavitz and Dean Morse. The Labor Market: An 
Information System (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1973).
Richard Knight. Employment Expansion and Metropol 
itan Trade (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).
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Charles Brecher. Where Have All the Dollars Gone? 
Public Expenditures for Human Resources Develop 
ment in New York City, 1961-1971 (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1974).
Alice M. Yohalem with Captain Quentin B. Ridgeley. 
Desegregation and Career Goals: Children of Air Force 
Families (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974).
Marcia Freedman with Gretchen Maclachlan. Labor Mar 
kets: Segments and Shelters (Montclair: Allanheld, 
Osmun & Company, 1976).
Eli Ginzberg. The Human Economy (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976).
Robert Cohen. The Corporation and the City (NTIS 
PB284371/AS, 1978).
David Lewin, Raymond D. Horton, and James W. Kuhn. 
Manpower Utilization and Collective Bargaining in 
Local Government (Montclair: Allanheld, Osmun & 
Company, 1979).
Alfred S. Eichner and Charles Brecher. Controlling Social 
Expenditures: The Search for Output Measures (Mont 
clair: Allanheld, Osmun & Company, 1979).
Alice M. Yohalem. The Careers of Professional Women: 
Commitment and Conflict (Montclair: Allanheld, 
Osmun & Company, 1979).
Beatrice G. Reubens. The Youth Labor Supply: A Com 
parative Sudy (Montclair: Allanheld, Osmun & Com 
pany, 1979).
Matthew Drennan. Regional Econometric Models: New 
York and Baltimore (forthcoming).
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A brief discussion of each of the foregoing together with 
related research investigations supported by other funding 
sources are set out in The Fortieth Anniversary Report, 1979 
of the Conservation Project.
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Many analysts regard "policy research" as a contradiction 
in terms. The only kind of research that many who make or 
influence decisions want to see are "findings" that confirm 
the wisdom of their past judgments and current policy posi 
tions. A substantial fraction of research supported by 
policymakers is exactly of this advocacy variety. My relative 
ly brief experience in Washington did not, however, turn me 
into a complete cynic on this question. I have seen situations 
where good research has changed people's minds and even 
situations where a demonstrated public interest prevailed 
over a private gain. That sort of research is the focus of this 
agenda for policy research on employment and training pro 
grams.
Good policy research should result in good programs. And 
good employment and training programs have as a defining 
characteristic the increasing of potential earnings of par 
ticipants above what they would otherwise have been. There 
may be other good or bad consequences of such programs. 
The ones I care about are increases in lifetime potential com-
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pensation from the labor market. Even where an employ 
ment and training program is designed to redistribute income 
within the economy, it is redistribution that takes the form 
of higher subsequent earnings for the participant. That is 
what makes it an employment and training program rather 
than an income transfer program.
This essay is divided into two parts. Part one develops my 
priorities for the Department of Labor's vastly diminished 
research budget. It argues that good data collection is the 
primary federal research role. None of the important policy 
questions can be resolved without good data, and the collec 
tion of such data is the unique responsibility of the federal 
authorities. At current budget levels, the first responsibility 
is to maintain existing longitudinal data sets. Then we must 
begin to collect adequate data on program participants and 
similar nonparticipants so we can determine whether pro 
grams are working and under what conditions. Even a bare 
bones research effort of this type would exhaust current 
budgets of the Office of Research and Evaluation of the 
Employment and Training Administration. I argue that the 
level of research expenditures should be closer to the levels of 
the Administration's original request for 1984 and to the 
levels that prevailed in the late 1970s.
The second part of this essay elaborates a more complete 
agenda for research and is directed to researchers and 
funders of all sorts. It follows what I take to be the natural 
set of questions to ask about an employment and training 
system. Finding the answers to these questions is the ra 
tionale for an employment and training research policy. The 
questions are:
1. Who should be the target of employment and training 
programs?
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2. What are the best potential "treatments" or sequences 
of "treatments" for specific types of potential par 
ticipants?
3. How should the employment and training system be 
organized and financed to best deliver the appropriate 
services to the appropriate participants?
Even though these three questions will be treated in 
separate subsections, it should be noted that there is poten 
tial interplay among the three types of questions. For exam 
ple, if members of a particular group are in trouble in the 
labor market yet no employment and training program 
would help them, they should not be a target for such pro 
grams. Similarly, if members of a particular group will not 
participate in a program, they should not be a target for par 
ticipation in that program. So these three questions define 
interrelated components in the design of an effective employ 
ment and training system.
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I. Research Priorities for the Employment 
and Training Administration in the Eighties
With the end of the massive research and development ef 
forts of the Youth Office, federal support for employment 
and training research is now almost totally concentrated in 
the Office of Research and Evaluation of the Employment 
and Training Administration. Table 1 shows the course of 
budget authority and outlays for that office by itself over the 
past seven years:
Table 1. Budget for Office of Research and Evaluation,
Employment and Training Administration
(in millions of dollars)


















Readers will note the substantial if erratic reduction in ex 
penditures under the Reagan Administration, though had it 
not been for the parochial intervention of a Democratic com 
mittee chairman, budget authority in 1984 would have 
returned at the Administration's request to the much higher 
nominal level of the late 1970s. I am sorry to note that the 
Administration's budget requests for 1985 are only for cur 
rent services. In the face of such cutbacks, what should the 
research priorities of the Employment and Training Ad 
ministration be?
The most important research function of the federal 
government in this area is collecting what might be called 
"problem" data for analysis of why poor earnings are 
generated and how actual and potential programs might 
raise such earnings. Private individuals will not collect or
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disseminate such data since the costs vastly exceed any 
potential private benefits. It also makes little sense for states 
to collect data that would be useful to all of them and might 
make some of them seem incompetent. Valid empirical 
research depends first on good data and the federal govern 
ment must be the unit of government to collect it.
The most important type of data for the government to 
collect is longitudinal information on the same individuals 
through time. This type of data has two unique virtues. First, 
it allows us to observe and control for effects of differences 
among people that persist through time. And this sort of 
population heterogeneity is one of the main problems for 
employment and training policy. Who should participate in 
such programs and how can we sort out program effects 
from unobserved differences among people? Longitudinal 
data are extremely helpful for answering such questions. 
Second, such data can help us identify answers to the ques 
tions that have the greatest impact on federal budget policy: 
how do decisions about work, family, consumption, and 
other matters in one period affect results in some subsequent 
period. The essence of employment and training investments 
is trading lower earnings now for higher earnings later. How 
these investments occur and how they might be improved are 
the key research questions for us. But similar questions arise 
for Medicaid, Medicare, AFDC, Social Security, and the 
disability programs.
Readers will recognize that I am arguing for the National 
Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) as the single most important 
research function of the Employment and Training Ad 
ministration. That item is where I would draw the wagons in 
a circle; of course, I hope it would not come to that. I am 
saying that it is the starting point.
This means that we should not let such longitudinal panels 
stop for transitory budget savings. The reason is simple. The
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costs of reconstituting such a sample when reason finally 
prevails are enormous. Consider the resource costs alone. 
The new youth cohort of the NLS cost about $2.5 million to 
start up. The entire NLS with all of its cohorts will cost less 
than twice that to maintain. But the real cost of stopping a 
cohort is in having to wait for years to build up enough 
history on individuals to get answers to important questions. 
Can we really afford to wait a decade to reconstitute a panel 
with enough history to answer questions we need answered 
about who is in trouble in the labor market, why, and what 
the probable course of earnings of program participants 
might have been in the absence of program participation?
My desire to keep the NLS alive does not mean I believe it 
to be the most sensible way to meet federal longitudinal data 
responsibilities in this area for all time. Just because Labor 
Department personnel had the foresight to initiate the NLS, 
why should it continue to be a primary responsibility of the 
Employment and Training Administration? Other 
longitudinal panels have been collected by other agencies. It 
is time for a coordinated approach to such data and it is time 
for the design and acquisition of such data to be passed on to 
the independent data collection agencies where they belong. 
The resources and the responsibilities for the NLS should 
probably now be turned over the the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics where decisions about data needs and costs can be 
shared better both within and across agencies and where 
decisions about how to change the size and duration of par 
ticular cohorts could be made on statistical grounds and not 
on the vagaries of political interests in active labor market 
policies. So when I argue for not using the NLS as the bridge 
over a temporary budget crisis, I am not arguing for im 
munity—only for a jury trial by its peers and a restraining 
order to prevent irreparable damage.
I would, however, go much further than simply keeping 
NLS from dying. The major policy responsibility of the
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Employment and Training Administration is to find out 
whether its programs are working and to identify which pro 
grams work best for which potential participants. Data are 
required that link subsequent labor market outcomes to 
specific "treatments" and sequences of "treatments" for the 
disadvantaged. And, of course, we need variation in 
"treatments" or controls in order to make some judgment 
about program effectiveness. The Continuous Longitudinal 
Manpower Survey (CLMS) was a complete failure at answer 
ing the most important policy questions about the programs. 
All we learned was that certain broad categories of program 
appeared to be more effective for women than men in the 
mid-1970s. The Labor Department's refusal to collect ade 
quate process data must be rectified if we are to have any 
idea about how to improve the employment and training 
system and not just whether to keep it.
This need for good process and outcome data in sufficient 
detail to evaluate programs at least in major states is par 
ticularly acute under the current Job Training Partnership 
Act, since so much authority has passed to the states with so 
little federal monitoring of activities. In a couple of years, 
Congress will want to know whether the Job Training Part 
nership Act is nothing but a transfer of funds to the states. 
And the states will want to know what programs are effective 
for which groups in which circumstances. Process and out 
comes must be better linked. The CLMS was only a poor 
start. The message is not to scuttle CLMS-type activities but 
rather to expand them and do them correctly. And next time, 
we should not have time and resources drained by the sort of 
unsatisfactory official analysis that accompanied release of 
each CLMS wave. If the lack of an official analysis makes 
some bureaucrats cringe, then it simply illumines more 
sharply the problem of trying to do nonadvocacy research in 
the current institutional setting and Congress might well con 
sider how to make program evaluation more independent.
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Program data collection should be linked to participant 
data and these should be linked to control group data such as 
the NLS or other federal longitudinal data surveys. Further, 
we need to collect data on the participation process itself so 
we can better learn how to adjust our results for selection 
bias (programs appearing to work or not work because the 
unobserved characteristics of the participants were 
systematically biased toward success or failure). Put simply, 
we need to understand how people get selected or select 
themselves for services. Not only is that question important 
in its own right, but it is essential to sorting out program im 
pacts from selection impacts. This whole program data col 
lection effort will cost at least as much as the NLS and would 
exhaust current ETA research budgets. Linkages with Social 
Security and other program administration data can give us 
more information for the dollar, but it will still be hard to 
collect much program evaluation data at required levels of 
detail and stay within current budget levels.
In order for this system to work well, other activities are 
required that could easily be done if we could return to the 
budget levels of the late seventies. First, the data need to be 
available in a highly subsidized, well-designed, on-line data 
base system so that researchers with a microcomputer and a 
modem can easily use the data. The National Opinion 
Research Center and The Ohio State University are taking 
only the first steps toward such a system now. Second, an in 
dependent committee needs to be established by ETA to 
decide how to add special questions to the NLS and how to 
add regularly new entrants to the cohorts in the sample. The 
model should be the way access is arranged for the federal 
research facilities in the natural sciences. I reiterate this point 
below, but we need to close the loop in social science 
research between anomalous findings and the generation of 
new data to shed light on mysteries. And we also need new
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entrants to the cohorts so we can sort out vintage changes 
from maturation effects within cohorts.
Finally, we need to provide small grants to researchers to 
help with the analysis. The model should be the dissertation 
grants program. Even senior researchers can occasionally be 
hired in return for summer money, research and clerical 
assistance, graduate student support and access to good 
data. And if the senior researchers need more, they are more 
likely to find funding elsewhere. The highest payoff is prob 
ably from using young academic researchers.
In this section, I have outlined what I would do with the 
level of research budgets observed in the late 1970s. I have 
not included any funds for evaluation of potential new pro 
grams (so-called demonstration or pilot projects) because my 
conclusion from our experience in the 1970s is that such 
research is costly relative to what we might learn. Of course, 
if states can be talked into planned variations that can be 
evaluated, the federal government could cheaply and effec 
tively do some of that evaluation. But the program money 
would have to come out of programs and the federal govern 
ment would have to be able to walk away from some of those 
demonstrations on the grounds that the program operators 
made serious evaluation impossible.
What follows are some more specific proposals for 
research at budget levels in excess of those in place at the end 
of the 1970s. They represent some of my wish list for foun 
dations and agencies of all sorts. I reiterate, however, that 
almost none of them are feasible or even worthwhile unless 
the basic data base requirements are taken care of first.
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II. Who, What, and How?
Who Should Be Helped?
Since the goal of employment and training programs is to 
improve unsatisfactory earnings, the first task is to identify 
the sources of low earnings. Understanding the generation of 
low earnings has two extremely important uses in the design 
of an employment and training system: first, it helps in iden 
tifying the appropriate target groups for such programs and, 
second, it plays an important role in the evaluation of pro 
grams by describing the probable course of earnings in the 
absence of any program intervention. Thus, good targeting 
and good evaluation both depend upon a good understand 
ing of what economists call earnings functions. Of course, 
economists have estimated literally thousands of earnings 
functions over the past few decades. I would argue, however, 
that some new emphases are required.
Earnings functions have several components to them. 
First, the earnings themselves can be divided into hours of 
work and wages per hour. Programs may affect these com 
ponents differently for different groups. Second, there are 
the characteristics of the earners associated with especially 
low earnings. These include the education, training, and 
work experience of the earner—all of which might be directly 
changed by an effective employment and training program. 
Other personal characteristics include the race, sex, and 
ethnic background of the earner. These might be associated 
with discrimination in the labor market and might suggest 
where compensatory and antidiscrimination policies could 
be helpful. Nonpersonal characteristics often associated with 
poor earnings include the industry and occupation of regular 
employment and the condition of the labor market in which 
the earner normally resides.
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The third component of earnings functions includes the 
fixed but typically unmeasured characteristics of earners. 
Even though these characteristics are unmeasured, we know 
about them from the simple fact that earnings of apparently 
similar individuals differ in persistent ways. The final com 
ponent of the earnings function is what might be called the 
shock or dislocation factor. People have good or bad years 
and sheer luck can propel them to a temporary or permanent 
change in their earnings. Even though these are random 
events, we can still learn about the typical size of such shocks 
and about the typical trajectory of earnings differentials 
associated with such shocks.
Economists have learned a great deal about the shape of 
earnings functions in the past decade. 1 We know that train 
ing programs have a greater effect on the hours of work of 
participants than they do on the wages of successful par 
ticipants. We know that education and experience account 
for something like a quarter of the variance in earnings. We 
know that other personal variables account for perhaps a 
fifth of the variance of earnings. And we know that other 
unmeasured fixed characteristics of earners account for 
perhaps another quarter of the variance of earnings. We also 
know that almost two-thirds of any shock to normal earn 
ings fades away within one year. In short, we can label 
perhaps half the correlates of variance in earnings observed 
in the population. Whether one considers the glass to be half 
full or half empty is not entirely a matter of taste. 
Understanding the unobserved portions of the earnings func 
tion needs to become a high priority if we are to understand 
how to match programs to individuals. Progress requires 
cooperative research projects among social science 
disciplines.
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I would identify the following important research issues 
on earnings functions for consideration:
1. Why should hours of work be more responsive to 
employment and training programs than the wages per hour? 
Do employers establish a set of minimum characteristics for 
potential employees at a given wage and only hire those who 
have those characteristics? Are there differences between 
employment and training interventions that affect hours and 
interventions that affect earnings? Are some types of poten 
tial participants more susceptible to hourly earnings gains 
and others to hours gains?
2. How can we develop less superficial measures of per 
sonal characteristics and of personal capacities? How, for in 
stance, do we adjust years of schooling and types of ex 
perience on the job to reflect differences in quality of those 
experiences that might be systematic across certain members 
of the population? One particularly acute problem in the 
employment and training area is that we are interested in 
programs that affect long term earnings and yet we want to 
evaluate programs quickly. This means that we have to 
develop tests that can measure changes in earnings-related 
characteristics of individuals. These should help define the 
content of programs as well. There already exist several tests 
for certain types of vocational skills and these need to be 
developed further. Since the Army is currently engaged in 
fairly elaborate analysis of skills required for certain jobs, 
more collaboration between civilian and military employ 
ment and training interests might pay off. The crucial point 
is to develop measures of skills and other characteristics 
which are in turn related to subsequent earnings gains. In 
deed, such tests would be validated by earnings gains.
3. We need to learn more about the nature of those fixed, 
unmeasured characteristics that account for at least a quarter 
of the variance in earnings in the population and are, I would
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argue, the most crucial portion in understanding concen 
trated earnings problems. Econometric techniques can iden 
tify for study individuals with persistently low earnings given 
their other characteristics. The defect of current social 
science research is the alienation of analysis from data collec 
tion. Unlike the natural sciences where a peculiar finding 
results in the design of new tests and the acquisition of new 
data, in the social sciences that linkage is much less evident. 
Those individuals with large negative fixed characteristics 
need to receive in-depth analyses. Simple massaging of ex 
isting data sets is not going to resolve these questions about 
health, motivation, decisionmaking and other factors. Even 
Herbert Parnes, who has collected one of the most important 
data sets available to modern social scientists has noted this 
problem:
After examining a computer print-out of the rele 
vant information for an individual, one generally 
longs for an opportunity to talk to her or him for 
an account of why things happened as they did and 
how this respondent reacted. 2
The loop must be closed to understand why some are 
special and what this implies about employment and training 
programs for them. This might involve both special inter 
views and also planned variation in providing employment 
and training strategies for such people. One way of identify 
ing a problem is to see what helps remove it.
4. It is important to explore differences in the recovery of 
individuals from negative earnings shocks or dislocations. 
These are typically modeled as first order Markov processes; 
is this the best characterization? How do the fade-out rates 
(transition probabilities) vary with the characteristics of the 
individuals involved and their situations? Neither industry 
nor occupation are good predictors of how rapidly an earn 
ings shock fades away, but general levels of unemployment 
in the local labor market are important. Why? One of the
56 A Research Agenda
difficulties facing programs for dislocated workers (workers 
with decent jobs who suddenly find themselves unemployed 
because of technological advance, competition, or reduced 
demand for their products) is determining who will likely be 
in long term trouble and who will recovery quickly. This was 
a special problem of the Trade Adjustment Assistance Act 
programs. It is a particular worry because provision of at 
tractive programs for those who rebound quickly by 
themselves might delay their recovery and waste scarce 
resources. Learning how to target such programs means 
learning which individuals will have the slow fade-out rate 
for shocks. Again, it may mean in-depth analyses after they 
are identified.
5. How do low earners move among labor markets, firms, 
jobs within firms, and occupations? We have little 
understanding of the way in which unobserved 
characteristics affect both low earnings and mobility deci 
sions. It may be that one of the better employment and train 
ing strategies for many involves incentives to workers and 
employers for mobility. What we seem to know from the 
literature on mobility is that there are movers and there are 
stayers. Why? Are these fixed, immutable characteristics? 
Can we find some way of distinguishing between these two 
categories before the fact as an aid in targeting various pro 
grams. Again, it requires statistical analysis to identify the 
stayers and clever probing to figure out why.
What Should Be Done? Toward Better 
Program Design for Particular Groups
If we have learned anything over the past two decades 
about employment and training programs, it is that different 
programs work better for different groups (and that some do 
not work at all). Discussion of research on program effec 
tiveness should therefore be organized by particular groups 
among those most likely to be distressed workers. This is not
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the place for a detailed argument about who is likely to be a 
distressed worker in the 1980s since I have only recently 
reviewed the evidence about that. 3 I will simply discuss pro 
gram research issues for the four key groups that might be in 
labor market distress: 1) youth having difficulty breaking in 
to the labor market; 2) disadvantaged adults with low nor 
mal earnings; 3) dislocated experienced workers; and 
4) distressed older workers.
Before turning to programs for those particular groups, I 
will consider macroeconomic policy because that affects all 
these groups. There is a division of labor in economic policy 
for dealing with the problems of distressed workers. There 
are the cyclically unemployed and underemployed and for 
them, by definition, the best program is a buoyant labor 
market. The other distressed workers are those who are, 
again by definition, structurally underemployed, 
unemployed, or poverty wage workers. The demarcation 
between these sets has been the subject of debates among 
economists for generations. 4 The more recent form of the 
argument is over whether there is a level of overall 
unemployment below which the inflation rate begins to ac 
celerate. Whether or not such a point exists, most agree that 
there are limits to how much overall macroeconomic 
stimulus can accomplish in eliminating unemployment and 
poverty level earnings. Because the limits on general demand 
stimulus are so important to employment and training 
policy, an agenda for research on macroeconomic issues 
belongs in the list of research issues discussed here. My en 
tries are:
1. How should business cycle conditions affect the mix of 
services provided by the employment and training system? 
This is a broad question on which many have already taken a 
position. For example, I have argued5 that the current 
employment and training system with no public service 
employment and few support services might have made sense
58 A Research Agenda
in the more normal labor market of the late 1970s and the 
programs of that period might have made more sense now in 
dealing with the long term unemployed who have exhausted 
their unemployment benefits and for whom welfare is not a 
viable option. Part of my argument rests on the difficulty of 
enforcing a work test for the long term unemployed who 
might otherwise be helped by extended unemployment in 
surance benefits during such a severe recession. Offering 
help in the form of a job may assure fewer adverse incen 
tives. But this is only a hypothesis worth examining. Are 
long term unemployed better off with a public job and is 
society better off transferring aid to them via such a 
mechanism? The supported work experiments examined the 
effectiveness of the well-designed sheltered workshop for the 
disadvantaged, but we have not adequately explored its value 
for the cyclically unemployed. Please note, I am not naive 
enough to think this would be a research priority of the cur 
rent Administration. But it is a strategy that ought to be of 
interest, especially in the context of workfare proposals. The 
parallel question is whether it makes sense to spend much 
money on training when unemployment is this high? Will 
such workers at best simply displace other workers? The 
displacement question is just as important for training pro 
grams as it was for public service employment programs.
2. What sets the limits for the employment-expanding 
possibilities of overall economic policy and how do these 
limits vary? Demographic characteristics have been em 
phasized in past research, but to say that there are more 
youngsters and women in the labor force and that the 
unemployment rate is higher is simply to relabel our ig 
norance. We know that unemployment consists of short 
spells by many and long spells by a few. We must disentangle 
those two components in our analysis of the relation between 
labor market conditions and inflation. Short spells might ac 
tually increase as the labor market becomes tighter and there 
is more job mobility; but why is long term unemployment so
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relatively unresponsive? What structural programs would in 
crease the responsiveness of the long term unemployed to 
buoyant labor markets? An additional limit on use of 
macropolicy to reduce labor market distress has been the in 
flationary impact of capacity utilization on product markets. 
As recently as 1973, labor and product markets appeared to 
tighten simultaneously. In the late 1970s, it appeared that 
produce market pressures on prices occurred well before 
labor market pressures. Why should such a disconnection 
occur?
3. How might government reduce inflationary labor 
market pressures without incurring such excessive costs 
among those who are at the margin of distress or poverty? 
We have known for some time that it takes an extra 1 percent 
unemployed for two years to lower the inflation rate by 1 
percentage point. That relationship has held for some years 
and it gives an idea of how costly it is to fight inflation 
through the labor market, especially when poor workers suf 
fer disproportionately from increases in unemployment. Are 
there ways of targeting deflationary pressures to increase 
their efficiency or are there ways of arranging real wage cuts 
in response to shocks like the OPEC oil price increases 
without incurring such heavy social costs? In our decentraliz 
ed labor markets, the idea of income policies to coordinate 
such reductions is attractive and may yet be needed in the 
1980s. Understanding how wage increases diffuse through 
the economy thus becomes important for understanding how 
to coordinate anti-inflation and employment and training 
strategies.
We turn now to a discussion of program research for each 
of the four distressed groups enumerated above. It should be 
noted that the Labor Department has supported so much 
research over the past two decades that many of the issues 
mentioned below have been touched upon in one project or 
another and so what follows is an agenda for continuing 
research as well as new research. 6
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Distressed Youth
Although youth unemployment rates are high, most youth 
have relatively little trouble entering the labor market. 
However, a concentrated group of youth (somewhere be 
tween 5 and 10 percent) do have considerable difficulty. 
They suffer long term unemployment and this results in 
lower earnings later in their lives. Youth from poor families 
with poor education and, if black, the additional problems 
of discrimination face horrendous problems in the labor 
market. An enormous amount of extremely useful research 
was mounted in the 1970s. I would recommend the following 
topics for further consideration:
1. How should alternative schools be designed for high 
school dropouts and potential dropouts? The Youth Incen 
tive Entitlement Pilot Projects showed that the offer of a job 
and an alternative school had little impact on dropping out 
of school, but it did cause many who had already dropped 
out to go into an alternative school program. There is much 
less indication of any impact on graduation rates, though 
perhaps some earnings impacts. In the new Administration's 
unseemly haste to close down the previous Administration's 
research efforts, many important questions were left 
unanswered. Was it the offer of a job or the offer of an alter 
native school or both that caused this return to a schooling 
program? What was the impact of that alternative schooling 
on the functional literacy of those who participated? These 
key questions should be the subject of a major research ef 
fort on youth. The objective should be to incorporate the 
elements of alternative schools as regular institutional 
features of the high school programs. There is, to be sure, a 
great danger in rigid design of special programs for potential 
high school dropouts. This restriction on student mobility, 
however, is likely to be more than outweighed by the dread 
ful consequences of simply ignoring such groups. Everyone 
is now talking about the design of excellent high schools, by 
which they mean better high schools for the better students. I
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am talking here about excellent programs in the high schools 
for the lower tail of the achievement distribution.
2. What do the noncollege bound students need to learn in 
high school? There is often a presumption that simple voca 
tional skills are the best subjects for such students. There 
seems to be ample evidence that the secondary vocational 
education system, while more costly than other forms of 
high school, does not generally provide long term earnings 
gains for its graduates. Clerical and industrial education pro 
grams do provide some short term earnings gains. What are 
the sets of vocational skills taught most usefully in a 
classroom setting and are there ways of increasing the effec 
tiveness of such instruction? Can we identify general voca 
tional skills that should be taught? Should we not also be 
teaching young people reasoning and problemsolving skills? 
Cognitive psychologists have been making considerable 
strides in understanding how to teach such skills to young 
people with relatively low IQs. Should such reasoning and 
functional literacy skills be taught more and should out-of- 
school youth also get such training? How can we encourage 
mixtures of formal classroom training with on-the-job train 
ing such as are found in the "dual system" of West Ger 
many. While that system cannot easily be translated to the 
United States because of substantially different traditions 
and institutions, the cooperative education movement is, 
perhaps, a viable model on which to build better educational 
experiences for noncollege bound youth.
3. What do employers really want in their entry level 
workers? It is my impression that upper level officers of 
large companies say they want workers who are generally 
trained and can therefore learn the specific skills required at 
a firm. Lower-level supervisors, on the other hand, are 
reputed to want workers who already know the specific skills 
that are required. It would be useful to analyze what kinds of 
skills are required and where those skills are best taught. We 
cannot simply rely on the market to handle this problem
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because the schools have generally done a poor job of trying 
to serve the poor students. Irrelevant instruction may explain 
why dropping out is so common for some groups and places.
4. Job Corps needs to be continually monitored. It is the 
most successful and unique of the American employment 
and training programs for the severely disadvantaged and, 
because its cost will always seem excessive to some, it is 
necessary continually to be able to make the case that the 
rate of return is high. It is also important to discover if that 
rate of return should start to fall. We should also explore 
how elements of the Job Corps program might be used in less 
expensive programs of a nonresidential character. In my 
view, Job Corps should be the centerpiece of the employ 
ment and training system and it should be recognized as a 
laboratory for design elements throughout the system.
Disadvantaged Adults
It has been the hope, particularly after the retargeting of 
programs in the early 1960s, that employment and training 
programs could raise the earnings of those workers whose 
normal earnings were below subsistance. It was an alter 
native to welfare. We now know from the negative income 
tax experiments that creating work incentives under welfare 
will be expensive because of the necessary adverse work in 
centives for those formerly above the break-even level. That 
means there is even more value to raising potential earnings 
of the poor through effective employment and training pro 
grams. Here are my candidates for research:
1. How can income transfer programs be better linked to 
employment and training programs? It is clear that a simple 
unified negative income tax is not desirable unless it is linked 
with the adoption of a simple flat-rate tax—and I do not 
consider that very feasible. Different groups should be sub 
ject to different tax rates and income guarantees depending 
on their family situation, employment prospects, etc. 
Employment and training programs can have a place in such
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a design. For one thing, such programs can help select out 
those who do not need labor market help. That has not been 
a popular perspective in this country, though it appears to be 
implicit in the programs of Sweden and some other coun 
tries. I again mention the possibilities of sorting the long 
term unemployed according to labor market attachment by 
offering benefits (such as training or job subsidies) that can 
ony be used in the labor market.
2. Why are job subsidies so ineffective despite the fact that 
economists find them so desirable? We have learned that 
employers do not respond much to employment incentives; 
there are reasons one can imagine, including red tape, worry 
about tax audits, certification by the government that those 
receiving vouchers are "turkeys," etc. But we do not know 
the answer, nor do we know if there are effective ways of 
offsetting these defects. Job subsidies to be used in the public 
or private sector ought to be the best way of doing targeted 
job creation. We know it is not. Why? Can some ex 
periments be devised to find out? While the Employment 
Opportunity Pilot Project was poorly designed, the question 
it was supposed to answer still remains.
3. Why did CETA and other programs seem to work bet 
ter for women than for men? Is it that the women were of 
higher quality because of sex descrimination in the labor 
market or other reasons? Is their access to comparable op 
portunities less? What does the answer imply about improv 
ing the design of programs for women and for men? Are 
there any useful interventions for adult men?
4. What is the relationship between low normal earnings 
and physical and psychological health and what does the 
linkage imply about the design of programs? A recent paper 
by some Vanderbilt colleagues suggests that those with fewer 
than eight years of formal education are three times as likely 
as high school graduates to have common diseases including 
cardiovascular, pulmonary, and musculoskeletal. 7 This
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would be one important mechanism linking low earnings be 
tween periods in an individual's life. Low education is cor 
related with low earnings. Is it a cause or effect of poor 
health? Answering such questions requires new types of in 
terdisciplinary research and an alliance between social and 
biological sciences that has not been the norm in the past.
5. Is there addictive behavior being generated by human 
resource programs as some conservatives suggest? Does 
government help breed dependency and are there some types 
of help that are more likely to breed the sort of independence 
that most of us want program participants to achieve? The 
question has not been taken seriously, but I believe it should 
be. In more formal terms, it is a question about how far back 
in the evolution of a person's career state dependency (in the 
Markovian sense) persists. Sociologists have pioneered 
methods for analyzing such problems using long panels of 
data and it is an important and tractable issue. How big is 
the effect and how can it be minimized?
6. Why is the serious bifurcation in the labor market for 
blacks occurring and what, if anything, can employment and 
training programs do about it? While earnings of young 
educated blacks has been rising to parity with similar young 
white cohorts, the relative earnings and income of less 
educated blacks has been falling so that average income dif 
ferentials between the races have stayed remarkably con 
stant. Many less educated blacks are simply dropping out of 
our statistics. Why? What are they doing? Are things getting 
worse or do they have better alternatives? Has the type of 
discrimination faced by blacks in the labor market become 
quality discrimination (blacks have to be better than whites 
to get similar jobs) or have education and training oppor 
tunities been getting worse for blacks at the low end of the 
distribution? Are new programs required and could some 
planned variation or experiments be devised to identify bet 
ter programs? A major effort needs to be undertaken to find 
the equivalent of Job Corps for such disadvantaged adults.
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Perhaps an intelligent program of prevention should be put 
in place and those who are too old should simply receive in 
come transfers. That decision should not be made on the 
basis of current knowledge.
Dislocated Workers
Experienced workers with good jobs have been laid off in 
record numbers over the past four years and this has led to a 
revival of the automation scare of the 1960s. I would hardly 
deny that the economy has been undergoing change and that 
we are moving closer to the day when no larger a share of the 
workforce will be involved in manufacturing than is now in 
volved in agriculture. However, I see no reason to panic 
about the pace of change. Some readers may respond, "Of 
course he sees no reason to panic, he is a tenured professor!" 
This is not the place for detailed argument, but many recent 
problems have been associated with the recession and many 
will be eliminated by the recovery. It is simply too early to 
tell whether, for example, the upper Midwest is in a serious 
long term decline or whether it is suffering from the fact that 
we have been using high interest rates to fight the inflation 
for the past four years. The upper Midwest specializes in the 
manufacture of interest-sensitive consumer durables. What 
seems pretty clear from the research of the past decades is 
that neither industry nor occupation is a good target for pro 
grams designed to help dislocated workers. The dislocation 
problems are most acute when individuals are not flexibly 
trained and when an entire labor market deteriorates. For 
dislocated workers, the following research topics should be 
considered:
1. Can the impact of the computer be predicted from 
analysis of the margins of change in the current economy? 
There is a tendency to focus on the job-displacing conse 
quences of the computer, but of course many jobs will be 
created as well. Furthermore, the effects will be indirect. 
Predicting the consequences of the invention and adoption 
of the automobile by simply focusing on what happened to
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horses and carriages now seems ridiculous to us. The 
automobile changed our entire economy and society. So the 
computer will allow the development of custom production 
where scale economies become less and less important. This 
means more people will be engaged in the design and 
matching of products to uses. What does all this imply about 
the retraining of workers and about the education of new en 
trants into the labor force? What general skills should high 
schools teach for labor market careers in excess of 50 years in 
such a new environment?
2. Under what circumstances are retraining programs ef 
fective for dislocated workers? Are retraining programs bet 
ter for women than men because they have more restricted 
mobility in our society and retraining might compensate for 
immobility? How does mobility relate to the design of 
retraining? The early results from the Down River 
demonstrations indicate poor results for retraining pro 
grams, though experimental evidence would be more per 
suasive on the matter. What other programs need to be link 
ed together for long term dislocated workers? For example, 
are there regional development efforts that can be facilitated 
by retraining, or is that a strategy for which troubled regions 
have no comparative advantage over growing regions like the 
Sun Belt?
3. Can incentives be designed and tested experimentally so 
that firms considering plant closings can help their 
employees find other jobs more quickly? Either tax advan 
tages or the employment of plant managers as consultants in 
the placement process might be worth trying. Could incen 
tives for early warning of at-risk workers be provided? There 
is now a high level of strategy involved in the negotiations 
with workers in such circumstances and the game may well 
be a prisoner's dilemma where some social intervention 
would make both parties better off.
4. Can labor market adjustment be aided by facilitating 
the flow of information on vacancies and job seekers? The
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real estate industry has managed to keep the matching of 
buyers and sellers private while collectively sharing informa 
tion through multiple listings. Could something along those 
lines be developed for the labor market? Anyone who has 
observed the job-matching by computer available in Sweden 
cannot fail to be impressed. Of course, Sweden is smaller 
and the public job service controls the market, but it is also 
true that they got the idea from experiments in Texas. This 
might be a service that could become self-financing after 
awhile.
5. For those workers who become long term unemployed, 
are there ways of giving assistance that will speed the labor 
market adjustment process? Experiments with alternative 
employment and training vouchers for training, job sub 
sidies, relocation assistance, and other devices might identify 
mechanisms with fewer long term disincentives than those 
found under our typical readjustment assistance programs 
developed in the 1970s.
Older Workers in Distress
As workers age, they become increasingly attached to par 
ticular firms and dislocation results in longer duration 
unemployment. For many, health and related problems sug 
gest that the best solution is retirement. But with increasing 
life expectancy, employment and training programs could 
have a 15 year pay-back period for a 55 year old worker. 
With an aging population and a need to raise the retirement 
age, this population will become an increasing focus of 
employment and training efforts. Society will increasingly 
face decisions about who should and who should not have to 
work. My candidates for research include:
1. What are the impediments to part-time employment for 
older workers and can something be done to reduce them? 
Fixed fringe benefits can make part-time employees quite 
unattractive. Can ways be found for the government to take 
over some of these and for employees to share more of the
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costs and benefits of such schemes? Would that reduce 
transfer costs by increasing labor supply?
2. Will age discrimination statutes that are easiest to en 
force on firings cause the locus of any age discrimination to 
shift to hiring? Is it generally becoming harder to get rid of 
bad employees and does that work to the detriment of hiring 
older workers? The answers to this might require some 
detailed analysis of employer behavior under different rules 
of seniority.
3. Can planned variation or experiments be devised to 
figure out the most effective employment and training in 
terventions for older workers? Should special programs be 
designed for them or can such people be well-served in ex 
isting programs as some recent evidence suggests?
How Should the System be Organized?
It should be no surprise, but research seems to have had 
less impact on the design of the delivery system than on any 
other component of employment and training policy. 
Research on delivery system issues is the most potentially 
threatening activity from the viewpoint of the policymaker. 
Yet research might inform the ideological debates and there 
are some topics that I would consider prime candidates for 
research.
I cannot resist one remark about delivery systems and our 
experience over the past two decades. Since the early 1970s, 
the system has moved increasingly to a decentralized design 
with states receiving increasing authority. Only one part of 
the system was exempted from the perpetual commotion 
associated with reform of the system and that was Job 
Corps. It is federally operated by subcontractors who are 
held to standards that are generally well-regarded. And it is 
this part of the system that has had the most consistent suc 
cess with the most difficult population: severely disadvantag- 
ed youth. Someone less familiar with the politics of employ-
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ment and training programs might ask why Job Corps is not 
the model of an effective delivery system for helping distress 
ed workers.
There are four research questions I would suggest:
1. What is the best mix of formal statistical evaluation 
techniques and of institutional control mechanisms to assure 
an effective system? A promising research strategy would in 
volve collaboration of political scientists and economists on 
comparative studies across countries. Sweden and Germany 
are generally reputed to have high quality systems. They sub 
ject themselves to little formal evaluation and so there is little 
evidence on their systems' effectiveness. On the other hand, 
they have created institutional arrangements and govern 
ment mechanisms that reinforce standards and relevance of 
training and they have established a highly professional 
system. We have generally failed to do that, though there are 
some examples of outstanding programs in particular places 
in the U.S. Both formal evaluation and good institutions are 
essential. We need research on how to design those institu 
tions for the particular local environments in the U.S.
2. It is now understood that in the absence of controlled 
experiments, it is only by modeling the selection of program 
participants and the goals of program operators that we can 
identify the impact of programs. From my point of view, 
formalizing the selection would help in evaluation. In fact, if 
selection were done by an examination (and the ironic result 
is that the worse the test, the easier it is to be confident of the 
estimates of treatment effects) then we could improve 
evaluation of alternative programs. If we cannot do random 
assignments, then we ought to consider selection tests. But 
we also need to understand selection issues because they are 
important in their own right. The government is interested in 
these programs in order to offset market failure and to pro 
vide new employment opportunities to workers whom 
employers have not especially wanted. Employers, on the
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other hand, want the best workers they can find. As we have 
shifted the balance of the system toward business control, 
the likelihood of creaming will increase. That may make the 
programs look better to the unsophisticated, but it will make 
the system less effective as a remedial device. That means 
that research on selection becomes one of the key points of 
inquiry about how the new JTPA system is working.
3. One of the ideological solutions to program deficiencies 
under the current administration is to convert competitive or 
monitored programs into general block grants to states. To 
my way of thinking, that will generate less efficiency. The 
competitive pressures and the oversight will be removed. 
Others argue, however, that local responsibility will more 
than offset such effects. This is a researchable question for 
the sort of methodology pioneered by Richard Nathan and it 
should be explored further.
4. Finally, we need to explore better linkages of finance 
and delivery, especially in conducting industrial policy. If we 
have to target aid to particular industries, I would argue that 
we should tax those same industries in the long run to pay for 
the benefits. Once that is done, I frankly do not care what 
the aid consists of. The rise and fall of the British Industrial 
Training Boards can provide a good deal of insight on this 
approach. The point is that we need to figure out how to link 
the financing of employment and training and other pro 
grams with the benefits and the costs. User fees might im 
prove programs as well as relieve tight budgets. I have 
argued that user fees could be a great source of improvement 
for the Job Service and the principle ought to apply 
elsewhere.
Conclusion
While research budgets for employment and training, like 
the programs themselves, have been reduced substantially, 
there are certainly many issues that could profitably be 
studied. The first priority of the Labor Department ought to 
be data collection. In a more decentralized system, the ac-
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quisition of data on outcomes, processes, and selection 
becomes essential if we are to know if the system is any good 
and if we are to improve the system.
Beyond that, I have listed a variety of research topics re 
quiring closing the research loop to help in finding new 
answers rather than just in recertifying old problems. There 
is simply too much specialization in our research. Rigorous 
research across several activities and disciplines could have 
large payoff. But that requires coordination and leadership.
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Few former federal career employees are even invited to 
come out of the closet of bureaucratic anonymity to reflect 
on programs they have administered. I immodestly accepted 
this invitation to discuss what I experienced and learned as 
the Director of the Office of Research and Development in 
the Department of Labor's Employment and Training Ad 
ministration between 1962 and 1980 because I believe that 
my observations might be of interest not only to labor 
economists but also to students of public administration.
Let me begin by making some general comments about im 
portant differences controlling administration in the public 
and private sectors. Public administrators are controlled by a 
law, many laws or regulations. Legalism in general, and laws 
in particular, tend to circumscribe and influence the opera 
tion of publicly administered programs more so than in the 
private sector. Administrators of private programs are told 
by law what they cannot do. The law tells the administrators 
of public programs what they can do. This is a subtle but im 
portant difference affecting decisions and freedom to act.
A second important difference is the goldfish bowl en 
vironment of life in Washington. In addition to perpetual 
scrutiny, public administrators are held to far higher ethical
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and moral standards than those found in the private sector. 
On top of these restraints, career public administrators must 
maintain a neutrality and professionalism not often required 
in private industry.
In spite of the laws, regulations and ethical standards, 
public administrators are expected to be effective and per 
form assignments. It is my belief that administrators of 
government programs must be more creative, imaginative 
and resourceful than their counterparts in private industry if 
they are to achieve program objectives.
The Department of Labor's Employment and Training 
Administration (ETA) program was conducted during 18 
years of turmoil, change and national unrest. During the 
1962-80 period the country was involved in two military wars 
and one massive social and economic war against poverty. 
The Research and Development program was conducted 
through recessions, inflation, race riots, and active civil 
rights movement leading to growth in minority power and oil 
price shocks.
The economy changed and required new and different 
skills from our workforce. The share of manufacturing jobs 
declined from about 30 to 20 percent of total employment. 
Service industry employment rose from 14 to 20 percent of 
all jobs and the proportion of employees working for state 
and local governments increased from 12 to 15 percent of 
total employment. Despite the unprecedented entry of in 
creasing numbers of young workers into the labor force and 
a 50 percent increase in our workforce, the country suffered 
no massive unemployment.
A social revolution was also changing the labor force par 
ticipation of women. While the participation rate for men 
declined in every age group between the ages of 20 to 64, the 
rates for women increased in every age cohort. Child rearing 
no longer forced most women out of the labor force. Be-
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tween 1962 and 1980, the labor force participation rate for 
women with children under the age of six more than doubled 
and the number of families headed by women also rose from 
4.5 to 9.0 million.
The ETA social science research program was established 
under Title I of the Manpower Development and Training 
Act (MDTA) of 1962, continued under the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973, and extend 
ed under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982. 
The Manpower Act was passed primarily in order to offset 
the displacement effects of automation and technological 
changes in workers. During the 1960 presidential campaign, 
Senator Kennedy was exposed to the large number of 
unemployed West Virginia coal miners who had lost their 
jobs because of the shifts to diesel locomotives and the 
greater use of oil and other sources of energy than coal. He 
promised the people of West Virginia that, if elected presi 
dent, he would try to assist them. He carried out his promise 
with manpower legislation which proposed to train and 
retrain workers who were unemployed because of automa 
tion and technological changes.
Those of us who participated in writing some sections of 
what eventually became the Manpower Act experienced the 
wondrous and mysterious ways of how legislation is 
prepared. At first, there was a period of intense and furious 
work. Our respective contributions were then collected and 
we never saw what the legislation looked like until it surfaced 
as the proposed Manpower Act. We never heard about, nor 
were we a party to, the negotiations as the proposed legisla 
tion drifted through the various agencies which were to par 
ticipate in its implementation. Once the bill appeared on the 
Hill we were reactivated again to write speeches for cabinet 
officers and legislators during the hearings and congressional 
debates.
76 An Administrator's Reflections
Before and after the Manpower Act was passed there was 
considerable contact with Swedish government officials who 
described their "active manpower policy" to U.S. 
policymakers. Under this philosophy, the Swedish govern 
ment was no longer a neutral observer of developments af 
fecting its workforce. Unemployment, industrial shifts and 
labor market operations were now a concern of the govern 
ment. Some, but not all, of the Swedish thinking was 
adopted by those involved in the development of a U.S. 
manpower policy during the early 1960s.
Title I of the Manpower Act called for a research program 
that differed quite radically from those then being conducted 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and other com 
ponents of the Department of Labor. For decades, BLS had 
collected information contributing to our fund of knowledge 
about the employment and unemployment of American 
workers. It also collected data on wages, prices and produc 
tivity. The Bureau was not expected to be concerned with 
policy-oriented research. Under the Manpower Act, the 
Department was now directed to collect information that 
could shape policy and programs. We were also given the op 
portunity to develop and test, in operational situations, ways 
in which manpower programs might more effectively meet 
significant manpower problems.
The new legislation called for a research program that con 
tributed to policies that would result in solutions of the prob 
lems created by ". . . changes in the structure of production 
and demand in the use of the Nation's human resources." 1 
The research office, which was created under Title I of 
MDTA, was allocated $2.8 million per year between 1962 
and 1970 to study, in addition to automation, the practices 
of employers and unions which impede the mobility of 
workers, appraise the adequacy of the nation's manpower 
development efforts and recommend programs for untrained 
and inexperienced youth. Armed with the imprecise and am-
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biguous language of the Manpower Act, we marched off to 
war to do away with unemployment and its causes.
Once the law was passed we discovered that it is far easier 
to write legislation than it is to translate legislative language 
into programs. An apprehensive group of federal employees 
met in Seymour Wolfbein's office on March 16, 1962, the 
day after President Kennedy signed the law. 2 To counter the 
perennial criticism of the underworked government 
employee, it should be documented that we worked an 
average of 10 to 12 hours a day for 7 days a week for a full 
year in order to launch the training and retraining programs. 
Substantive work was conducted on Saturdays and Sundays 
when the telephone switchboard was closed. The initial plans 
for a research program were developed in between hundreds 
of telephone calls and numerous speeches given around the 
country. The first year was a true test of our physical 
stamina and emotional stability.
In order to put a publicly administered research program 
in proper context, it may be helpful to discuss both the inter 
nal and external environment which influenced and affected 
some of our decisions and programs.
Internal Environment
Much has been written about the relationship between 
political appointees and career government employees. Each 
president can bring in to his administration 2,500 new ap 
pointees. The job qualifications of these policymakers and 
knowledge of the programs they administer may vary con 
siderably. There is always an uncomfortable period of 
testing that goes on between political appointees and career 
employees until mutual respect and trust is developed. The 
research office seems to have survived a succession of 
policymakers by demonstrating its ability to contribute its 
knowledge to the needs of a variety of policymakers.
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The management staff of ETA, consisting of career 
federal employees, was a problem of another sort. The 
budget responsibilities and oversight authority of the pro 
curement process of the management personnel enabled 
them to exert considerable power over our activities. We had 
frequent disputes with the management people because of 
their lack of understanding of social science research and 
their distrust of social scientists. Most of the previous ex 
perience of the management staff had been limited to the 
purchase of desks, chairs and other supplies and equipment. 
We sought a flexibility in our work with social researchers 
that was foreign to their way of thinking. Until we 
demonstrated our usefulness to the political appointees and 
the operating managers of ETA's programs, our research 
budget was considered fair game for purposes other than 
research by the management personnel
Another group which contributed to a hostile environment 
for a research program in a mission-oriented agency was the 
administrators of programs such as Unemployment In 
surance, the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training (BAT) 
and the operators of training and retraining activities.
Our challenge was to persuade some of these ad 
ministrators that a research program could be useful to 
them. We needed their cooperation because their programs 
were relevant to our mission. Furthermore, if they par 
ticipated in decisions on research projects they might be 
more inclined to utilize our findings in their programs.
We finally worked out a strategy that proved most effec 
tive. After our annual budget increased from $2.8 to $13.0 
million in 1970, we set aside a fixed sum of money that was 
to be used for research and development purposes for each 
operating component of the Employment and Training Ad 
ministration. We used committees, consisting of represen 
tatives of the research office and operating agencies, to
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review and make decisions about research projects relevant 
to their missions. We learned that money is an effective tool 
for winning friends in the public sector of the economy.
Some examples of committee-sponsored research included 
an assessment of the counseling service of the Employment 
Service and a study of how the productivity of local employ 
ment offices could be improved. The committee also spon 
sored an examination of the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles to determine its usefulness and its users. Although 
money was effective in reducing some of the hostility to 
research, we had recurrent problems in trying to persuade 
our peers that we were not about to invade their jurisdic 
tions.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics was another organization 
that had to be assured that we were not taking over their 
functions. Again, money and strategy helped to ease ten 
sions. As indicated earlier, the Manpower Act directed us to 
appraise the adequacy of the nation* s manpower develop 
ment efforts to meet foreseeable needs for workers. We ask 
ed the Bureau of Labor Statistics to conduct a pioneering 
survey of how American workers acquired training for their 
jobs. 3 This study both eased our relations with BLS and gave 
the country its first view of the extent of job training in the 
U.S.
Our one major conflict with BLS took place over their 
reluctance to reassess their data collection system in urban 
centers. We had supported the work of anthropologists who 
lived in ghetto areas. They reported that many minority 
workers had become discouraged and dropped out of the 
labor market. In their view, BLS surveys did not correctly 
measure the extent of unemployment in ghetto areas. Even 
tually, BLS was persuaded to examine the problem of under- 
counting which led to a new data series on unemployment in 
central cities.
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The final point about our internal environment concerns 
our experience with the Bureau of Apprenticeship and Train 
ing. In reviewing our mandate to collect information about 
the training of American workers, it became obvious that 
although the apprenticeship system trained a relatively small 
number of craftsmen, it played a significant role in preparing 
some of the country's most skilled workers. The close rela 
tions of the personnel of BAT with the unions made it dif 
ficult to conduct any research that might appear in any way 
to loosen the trade unions' control of a training system that 
affected the supply of workers.
In order to learn more about the apprenticeship system 
and to conduct studies to modernize it we devised a strategy 
that would avoid a confrontation with either BAT personnel 
or the unions. Our plan called for the development of a 
model apprenticeship program that could be used as a com 
parison by unions and employers now conducting programs. 
We proposed a new system for realistically determining the 
number of hours required for learning the plumber and 
pipefitter trade.
We asked Dr. John Dunlop of Harvard, who was trusted 
and respected by union leaders, to review our plan and, if it 
proved acceptable to him, to use his negotiating skills to per 
suade the unions to go along with our proposed study. After 
he approved our approach, he encouraged trade union 
leaders to participate in the preparation of a model appren 
ticeship program which was developed at Purdue University. 
The results of the study were published in a series of 
monographs which were widely distributed and contributed 
to the modernization of some apprenticeship programs.
To sum up our internal environment problems, we suc 
ceeded in having research and development accepted in a 
mission-oriented agency only after we demonstrated the 
usefulness of our findings. Research could be conducted if
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we avoided face-to-face confrontations and developed 
strategies that would not directly challenge programs or 
jurisdictions. Money was helpful, but the committee system 
which involved the potential users of research was also effec 
tive in developing cooperative working relationships. Final 
ly, knowledge of institutional politics and access to persons 
who could help us to achieve our objectives proved to be of 
inestimable value.
The External Environment
The most important component of our external environ 
ment was the research community. We were launching a pro 
gram that required researchers who were interested in prob 
lems of unemployment, underemployment, labor market 
operations, discrimination, skill training and the special dif 
ficulties faced by the "economically disadvantaged" of our 
society. In surveying the literature of the early and 
mid-1960s, we were struck by the small number of scholars 
who were studying the problems specified by MDTA and its 
amendments. Most of the social scientists whose 
backgrounds and experience were remotely related to our 
subjects of interest were studying unions, collective bargain 
ing, wages, etc. Columbia University's Conservation of 
Human Resources, under Dr. Eli Ginzberg's direction, was 
the only on-going institution concerned with labor market 
issues relevant to our mission.
In examining the early proposals submitted to our office 
we concluded that we were suffering from a "tired blood" 
syndrome in that so few young researchers appeared to be in 
terested in studying the issues which concerned us. In an ef 
fort to attract new researchers we first broadcast, through a 
variety of channels, our interest in supporting research on a 
specified list of employment and training problems. We were 
overwhelmed with proposals that seemed to come primarily
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from persons or organizations with little or no research 
background.
Dr. Ginzberg, in discussing our experience with us, sug 
gested that we produce our own experts. This led us to start a 
doctoral dissertation program which proved to be one of our 
most significant long term accomplishments. Many of the 
country's leading social scientists now working on employ 
ment and training issues were able to get their Ph.D.s 
through this program. 4
During the early years we primarily used unsolicited pro 
posals and sole source awards in order to secure research per 
formers. We often sought out specialists who were studying 
subjects relevant to our program needs. Once our budget in 
creased and we could be involved in more costly research and 
development efforts, we made greater use of Requests for 
Proposals (RFPs). We tried, however, to maintain a balance 
between unsolicited proposals and RFPs because we always 
wanted to have access to the talents of the academic com 
munity. RFP procurements appeared to attract few college 
professors because they were not able to match the grants- 
manship capability of the consulting firms.
About two-thirds of the proposals submitted were re 
jected. Ninety percent of the unsolicited proposals were turn 
ed down. We were constantly winnowing not only the pro 
posals but also the researchers. We had to distinguish be 
tween scholars who appeared to be only concerned with fur 
thering their disciplines and those who were genuinely in 
terested in social and economic problems. Many of the 
researchers who were caught in the publish or perish syn 
drome submitted proposals that were more directed toward 
furthering their reputations than in making contributions to 
our knowledge about the social and economic issues iden 
tified in MDTA. We found very few scholars or consulting 
organizations able to assist us in getting research findings
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utilized or interested in following through in having their 
studies used for policy decisions.
There was, and still is, a real shortage of social scientists 
capable of combining their research background with the 
very practical real world problems of organizing and con 
ducting experimental and demonstration projects with 
rigorous research designs. Few, if any, of our training in 
stitutions appear to have recognized the need for researchers 
who can both apply scientific research methods and carry 
out the necessary nitty-gritty chores required for establishing 
small-scale experimental and demonstration projects which 
can tell policymakers whether large-scale programs are feasi 
ble or desirable.
One of the key factors affecting the success or failure of a 
research and development program is the review process. 
Before we made a decision on which review method to use, 
we consulted with several research offices in federal agen 
cies. After prolonged and frank discussions with some of the 
administrators who established the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) we decided not to use peer review of proposals 
by nongovernmental panels of experts. Although this system 
was in use at NIH, we were advised that if they were starting 
all over again, some of these administrators would no longer 
use this system. Their view was that peer review too often 
ends up in an "old boy" system of mutual back-scratching. 
They also believed that new young researchers and in 
novators found it more difficult to break into the funding 
circle controlled by more established scientists. We settled on 
a review system which included staff assessment and exten 
sive examination by specialists in the federal government as 
well as by nongovernmental experts.
No honest account of a research and development ad 
ministrator's reflections could possibly exclude reference to 
the real world of political pressures that pervade the very air 
of Washington. Let me start with the flat assertion that I was
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always surprised by how little pressure was exerted on us to 
fund performers who came through the political route. 
Ninety-nine percent of the products we funded were based 
on our decisions rather than those imposed by political ap 
pointees. If there is credit or blame to be given for success or 
failure of this particular research and development effort, it 
should be directed to the career staff who administered the 
program.
This does not say that efforts were not made to secure 
funding through the political route. Most of these proposals 
were fended off by our normal review process. Remember 
that our office rejected at least 90 percent of unsolicited pro 
posals. Upon occasion, in order to take heat off career 
employees, we would convene ad hoc panels of well-known 
social scientists to review a proposal in which either the 
White House or a congressman had indicated more than 
casual interest. After this review, we were usually able to in 
form the applicants and their sponsors how a panel of na 
tionally known experts had voted.
There seemed to be little difference in the amount of 
pressure exerted by either of the two major parties. We 
learned that, for the most part, bona fide researchers did not 
apply for funding through the political route. We identified 
pressure as proposals forwarded by the White House or sent 
to us by senators or representatives. It was relatively easy to 
distinguish between proposals that were transmitted as a 
matter of routine courtesy to constituents from those in 
which there was a genuine interest.
Congressional oversight of our program was minimal. The 
Office of Management and Budget's annual review was 
primarily an educational activity to apprise the examiners 
and analysts of our findings and major funding. We had two 
experiences with the General Accounting Office (GAO). In 
the first instance we were advised that GAO was prepared to 
launch a major study of how we used our research products.
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After spending two hours explaining that we had established 
a separate division just to concentrate on the utilization of 
research and development findings and specifying how this 
activity was being conducted, the representatives of GAO 
quietly left and never returned. We were visited a second 
time by the GAO for an examination of our procurement ac 
tivities. After an exhaustive survey they tapped us on the 
wrist by pointing out that some of our files were incomplete 
in that all necessary documents were not immediately 
available.
We had one experience with the donor of the Golden 
Fleece Award. For several years we had been conducting a 
series of studies and small-scale research demonstration pro 
jects to determine whether income assistance might reduce 
recidivism among ex-offenders. We were interested in the 
employment experience of ex-offenders because one out of 
two clients in the manpower programs had either arrest or in 
carceration records. Local, state and federal correctional in 
stitutions were releasing prisoners to the outside world with 
sums of money that varied from 25 cents to $50 or just a suit 
of clothes. Our earliest research indicated that most ex- 
offenders would have to depend on the weak reed of friends 
or relatives for income support after they left prison.
After years of careful documentation and review of our in 
itial review and experimental and demonstration efforts by a 
panel of penologists, we decided to conduct an experiment in 
Georgia and Texas to determine whether unemployment in 
surance might reduce the recidivism rate of released 
prisoners. Shortly after the project began a Georgia 
newspaperman called Senator Proxmire's office to advise a 
member of his staff that the Department of Labor was fund 
ing a project which gave money to "pimps, rapists and 
murderers." We were immediately called and asked to sub 
mit a description of our project to the Senator.
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We forwarded the requested material which described the 
experimental design, our years of study, and the rationale 
for the work. We also pointed out that Dr. Peter Rossi, 
former president of the American Sociological Association, 
was chief researcher and that the project was being supervis 
ed by the American Bar Association. We waited a few days 
before calling the Senator's assistant, who was most pleasant 
to us. He complimented us so highly on our rigorous design 
and professional research that I was moved to ask whether 
the Senator might want to consider the project for a Dia 
mond Fleece Award as an exemplary government research 
project. I was told that I was overstepping my bounds and 
the conversation was abruptly terminated. That was the last I 
heard from this type of senatorial oversight.
To summarize our external environment, we created a 
research community of scholars interested in employment 
and training issues by launching a doctoral dissertation pro 
gram which proved to be very helpful in encouraging young 
scholars to study labor market operations. We tried to main 
tain a balanced procurement process which left the door 
open so that we were exposed to new and innovative ideas 
and researchers. We were constantly searching for research 
ers who were concerned with the impact of their studies on 
policy issues. We found very few social scientists who could 
develop a good research design and translate it into a real 
world experimental or demonstration project. Apparently, 
our proposal review process effectively minimized political 
pressure on career employees.
Research Strategy
The primary motive for passage of the Manpower Act was 
to provide training and retraining in order to ameliorate the 
effects of automation and technological changes on 
unemployed workers who previously had a relatively strong 
attachment to the labor market. These were the white blue-
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collar workers whom Senator Kennedy had seen during his 
presidential campaign in West Virginia. In addition to 
automation, the act directed us to discover why shortages of 
qualified personnel existed even during periods of high 
unemployment. We were also expected to identify areas of 
current and prospective manpower shortages and to report 
on occupations which promised reasonable expectations of 
employment and on-the-job training opportunities for 
trainees who participated in government sponsored training 
programs.
Shortly after the legislation was passed, students of labor 
market changes noted that despite all of the talk about 
automation, unemployment was declining and the number 
of employed workers was increasing. Between 1962 and 
1965, the rate of unemployment dropped from 5.5 to 4.5 per 
cent and employment rose by 4.3 million from 66.7 to 71.0 
million. Other researchers also reported that the automation 
of the early and mid-1960s was not about to wipe out 
millions of jobs and leave us with mechanized factories that 
would displace millions of workers.
Some students of the American economy alerted the coun 
try to the growing number of unskilled and poorly educated 
workers who could benefit from training and retraining. Our 
office conducted a survey for President Kennedy's Task 
Force on Manpower Conservation which was published with 
the nostalgic title of One-Third of a Nation. This report 
documented that one-half of the young men called for prein- 
duction examination under Selective Service were found un 
qualified for military service. 5 Fully one-third of the age 
group did not meet the required standards of health and 
education. Our survey also showed that a major proportion 
of these young men were the products of poverty that they 
inherited from their parents and unless the skills of the re 
jectees were upgraded, these young men would face a 
lifetime of recurrent unemployment.
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The labor force data, White House memoranda, popular 
articles and books on poverty, One-Third of a Nation, all 
contributed to a major shift in manpower policy from con 
centration on workers displaced by automation to 
economically disadvantaged workers and youths. By the end 
of the Kennedy Administration and the beginning of the 
Johnson presidency, manpower policy had moved to the war 
on poverty.
Developing a meaningful and coherent research strategy 
for a social science program in a federal agency proved to be 
a real challenge. Annual budgets, a constantly shifting group 
of political appointees, changes in priorities and the need of 
policymakers for immediate answers to complex issues made 
it difficult to plan for a long term program. We were acutely 
aware that social science research was more capable of pro 
viding information than solutions to complex and deep- 
rooted economic and social problems. For this reason, we 
could not over promise results to political managers who 
wanted clear cut unambiguous research findings which could 
be used for making decisions.
In order to survive, our research strategy called for two 
levels of projects. Realistically, we knew that a research 
organization in a mission-oriented federal agency must put 
aside a certain proportion of its resources for what can be 
described as "quick and dirty" research. This research was 
designed to give political appointees and other ad 
ministrators information that could be used for making cur 
rent policy decisions.
The second type of research, which we believed was more 
suitable to social science research capabilities, was directed 
toward the cumulative acquisition of information about ma 
jor employment and training problems. One of the most im 
portant lessons we learned in administering the research and 
development programs is that ad hoc and unrelated projects 
do not, for the most part, have as great an impact as
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cumulative research on major social and economic issues. 
Those of us who started ETA's research and development 
program soon came to the realization that social science 
research is more comparable to the slow, long term ac 
cumulation of information about cancer than the discovery 
and immediate application of the Salk vaccine leading to the 
sudden disappearance of infantile paralysis.
The best example of an investment in basic and long term 
research was our support for a national longitudinal survey 
of 20,000 workers which began in the mid-1960s and is still 
continuing in 1984. The data of the labor market experience 
of 20,000 workers representing the American labor force in 
four broad age categories are collected by the Census 
Bureau. The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) data in 
clude information on employment and unemployment ex 
perience, occupational training, aspirations, education, 
health, family backgrounds and exposure to counseling. The 
cumulative data base of the NLS is now one of the nation's 
most important sources of information on the work ex 
perience of American workers. The findings of the NLS have 
had an impact on legislation, programs and policy decisions. 
They have been analyzed and used by scholars in hundreds 
of articles, monographs and books.
Another example of long term support was the study of 
the effects of occupational licensing on the employment op 
portunities of nonprofessional workers. 6 After a 1967 survey 
of state and local licensing laws which set the groundwork 
for further exploration, we embarked on a series of studies 
and action programs which continued through 1980. In 
order to remove the barriers of occupational licensing to 
employment, we funded the researcher to become a "change 
agent" to testify before local political leaders and state 
legislators so that they would know how to draw up more 
equitable licensing laws. He was consulted extensively by 
persons concerned with improving occupational licensing 
laws throughout the United States.
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In addition to recognizing the benefits of cumulative 
research we also learned that the social and economic prob 
lems we studied rarely fit neatly into any single social science 
discipline. Cultural differences, motivation, education, 
training, health and discrimination were just some of the 
reasons workers experienced difficulty in the labor market. 
Our clients had problems which cut across several disciplines 
rather than any single one. For this reason, we made a 
deliberate effort to involve sociologists, anthropologists, 
psychologists, demographers, political scientists, and other 
social scientists in our research program. We also sought out 
social scientists who were capable of interdisciplinary 
research.
In developing our research agenda we followed a practice 
of specifying major issues and problems. We then asked the 
research staff to articulate a number of researchable and in 
tegrated questions that could be explored and lead to a 
cumulative base of information. We then sought scholars 
who may have already started studying some of the issues or 
tried to persuade others to direct their research skills to the 
economic and social problems of concern to us. We often 
followed and supported these peripatetic scholars who were 
willing to make long term commitments to subjects of in 
terest to the research and development program, as they 
moved from university to university.
As one would expect, we were originally inundated with 
proposals to study the effect of automation and 
technological changes on skill requirements and employ 
ment. We had the difficult task of separating charlatans 
from legitimate researchers. We discovered that there was a 
cadre of social scientists who were willing to devote their 
careers to following newspaper headlines in order to study 
"popular" subjects. Many of these researchers suffered 
from a reverse of the Midas principle. Wherever there was 
gold, they wanted to touch it.
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After the shift in policy and priorities from automation to 
concentration on the problems of the economically disad- 
vantaged, we decided that studies of labor market operations 
would be the basic foundation of our research strategy. We 
then went on to support research that examined institutional 
obstacles that some workers faced in entering and maneuver 
ing through the labor market. In addition to studies of 
employers' hiring practices, occupational licensing and job 
market information, we supported research which examined 
the special employment problems of blacks, Hispanics, 
women, youth, older workers, ex-offenders and migrant 
workers.
In order to broaden the research strategy, some of the 
country's leading social scientists were first invited to join a 
committee to advise the research office on future program 
directions. Because members came from different 
disciplines, it was sometimes difficult to secure agreement on 
subjects for studies or research methodologies. Eventually, 
the committee was discontinued and greater dependence was 
placed on staff-originated proposals, unsolicited proposals 
and suggestions forwarded by the operating, planning and 
policy staffs.
As a result of the merger, in 1970, of the Office of Special 
Manpower Projects and the research office, the new annual 
research and development budget increased from $2.8 to 
$13.0 million. This larger budget enabled the office to now 
support experimental and demonstration projects in addition 
to conventional research. We hoped that these small scale ex 
perimental and demonstration projects could now be used to 
test the feasibility of new concepts and programs before 
moving to large national efforts.
The Office of Special Manpower Projects originally was 
assigned to support experimental and demonstration efforts 
during the 1960s. These projects were operated primarily as 
catalysts for social action, with the formal generation of in-
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formation and insight regarding operational problems as an 
important, but subsidiary, concern. The new combined Of 
fice of Research and Development (ORD) adopted a policy 
that research had to be an integral component of all ex 
perimental and demonstration projects. The operators of 
experimental and demonstration projects who were primari 
ly oriented to provide services to clients also had to be per 
suaded to cooperate with researchers who were studying 
their programs.
We soon discovered that "carrying out any social experi 
ment successfully is a managerial tour de force. . . ." 7 Our 
largest investment in a demonstration research project with a 
randomized experimental control group was Supported 
Work which was a 5-year effort to test whether individuals 
with severe employment problems could be made 
employable by exposing them to a controlled work ex 
perience. The demonstration research project proved most 
effective in preparing for employment a substantial number 
of women who had been on welfare (AFDC) for many years. 
The program also had an impact on a significant segment of 
the study's ex-addict population. There was only a marginal 
effect on ex-offenders who did not show less criminal 
behavior and whose rate of employment and earnings were 
only slightly better than a control group of ex-offenders. 
Neither was there any long term positive results for the 
youths in the demonstration project.
A second random experimental control project, which 
coincidentally also offered services to female heads of 
households in AFDC, involved an effort to move women on 
welfare from the secondary to the primary labor market so 
that they could become self-supporting. Welfare mothers 
were entered in selected training institutions that offered 
tightly structured instructional formats, remedial education 
and a proven record of placing graduates in expanding oc 
cupations with starting wages of more than $9,000 per year. 
We learned that it was possible to make a certain proportion
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of women on welfare self-supporting. The results indicated 
that a significant investment in training, remedial education 
and supportive services could overcome the destructiveness 
of poverty, poor education and discrimination for some 
women on AFDC. 8
In summing up our experience in developing and main 
taining a research strategy in a mission-oriented federal 
agency, it is worth noting that missions are subject to change 
even without new legislation. For example, the concept of 
"economically disadvantaged" was not articulated in the 
laws controlling our programs until the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (CETA) of 1973. The 
spillover of the war against poverty, which pervaded the 
government during the 1960s, contributed to the change of 
the direction of the employment and training program.
As indicated earlier, administrators of federal research 
and development programs, if they are to survive, must be 
responsive to the immediate needs of political appointees 
and be prepared to support short term research that might be 
useful for current policy decisions. Although cumulative, 
long term information-building research seems to provide 
more valid findings than some ad hoc research, it is far more 
difficult to introduce and maintain in a federal environment 
oriented to annual budgets and quick and easy solutions of 
enormously complex problems.
The deep-rooted causes of unemployment, discrimination 
and other factors handicapping workers rarely match single 
social science research disciplines. For this reason, inter 
disciplinary research efforts and more cooperation among 
federal agencies are needed to explore social and economic 
problems assigned to the government. Finally, in spite of the 
difficulties in managing experimental and demonstration 
projects and their other limitations, greater effort should be 
made to test small scale exploratory projects before launch 
ing major national large scale programs.
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Policy: The Evanescent Goal
Government decisions affecting policies or courses of ac 
tion are generally not traceable to a clearly demarcated 
event. Instead, they are more likely to be part of a slow, inef 
ficient and haphazard process. Unfortunately, research find 
ings are rarely available at the exact moment they are needed 
in making policy decisions. Furthermore, many research 
studies produce ambiguous results at a time when a decision- 
maker seeks clear-cut findings. Because of timing and am 
biguity problems, social science research can primarily con 
tribute enlightenment rather than solutions to the 
policymaking process. Notwithstanding the inherent dif 
ficulties associated with social research, administrators of 
federal research and development programs are regularly 
challenged by newly appointed political officeholders with 
the question, "What impact has your program had on 
policy?"
In assessing the effect of ETA's research and development 
program on policy decisions, it is well to keep in mind that 
between 1962 and 1980, the Department of Labor had eight 
secretaries and five assistant secretaries responsible for ad 
ministering employment and training programs. One could 
reply to the previous question with another question, 
"Whose policy?" Not only did the top personnel change 
quite often, but so did the policy direction of the program. 
As noted earlier, program concentration shifted from 
workers affected by automation to economically disadvan- 
taged workers. The system of delivery of services changed 
drastically between MDTA and CETA from centralized 
delivery to decentralization. New deliverers of service known 
as Prime Sponsors were introduced. In addition, public 
employment programs were introduced in the 1973 legisla 
tion and the responsibility for providing services to special 
target groups such as youth, offenders, persons of limited 
English-speaking ability and older workers was assigned to 
the federal government.
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The combination of the number of political appointees, 
their rapid turnover and short term orientation as well as ma 
jor shifts in priorities and philosophy compounded the job 
of a research administrator interested in developing a 
coherent, cumulative, long term program that could con 
tribute to policy decisions. We soon learned that most 
political appointees are not interested in funding projects 
that will deliver findings long after they have left office.
Our experience in trying to introduce policy issues in the 
President's Manpower Report (also known as the Employ 
ment and Training Report of the President) is worth noting. 
We were constantly criticized because this report, which was 
our responsibility, was not used as a vehicle for introducing 
new significant policy issues. In response to this criticism, we 
attempted to introduce policy issues which we thought could 
be agreed upon by the review process. We discovered that 
unilaterally originated policy was shot down in the extensive 
interagency review process. Each reviewer refused to accept 
responsibility for approving a policy that had not been 
previously agreed upon by his political superior. It became 
obvious that this was the wrong way to introduce policy 
issues. In order to bring new employment and training policy 
issues to the fore it would have been first necessary to secure 
agreement from cabinet officers and then use the report 
route. We decided that it was not worth the time and effort 
and were content to let the report simply describe programs 
and provide data on labor force, employment and 
unemployment, hours, earnings and turnover.
In addition to a very active publishing program which pro 
duced dozens of monographs summarizing what we learned 
from research and development projects, we devised several 
tactics for bringing current research findings to the attention 
of policymakers so that they could be used in the decision- 
making process. One device which proved to be quite effec 
tive was to ask researchers to make personal presentations to 
people in policy positions. During the height of the U.S.
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debate on the possible use of public service jobs in employ 
ment and training programs, one of our researchers reported 
to the Secretary of Labor on a study of the effect of public 
service programs on unemployment in several European 
countries. Another researcher discussed with an assistant 
secretary the findings of a study of the employment prob 
lems of black professional women in southern cities. A 
Secretary of Labor heard a detailed report on the results of a 
long term study of income assistance to ex-offenders. This 
procedure effectively kept policymakers current with the 
latest research findings.
Executive summaries of the results of research and 
development projects relevant to their work or interest were 
distributed regularly to policymakers in the Department of 
Labor, executives in other federal agencies, senators and 
representatives, and key staff members on the Hill. Interest 
groups and leaders of public opinion in the public and 
private sectors were sent selected research and development 
reports. Monographs and reports were sent to the research 
community. For example, Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. 
Piore's work on the dual labor market theory was published 
as an ETA monograph and given wide distribution. In 
recognition of the cumulative nature of social science 
research, we published syntheses of several reports on the 
same general subject area.
The products of the research office probably had their 
greatest impact on legislation. We were able to directly trace 
the findings of research studies on amendments to the 
original Manpower Act. Reference to certain target groups 
and concepts introduced in the CETA legislation can be trac 
ed back to research and development findings. Our location 
in the Office of Policy, Evaluation and Research gave us 
easy access to staff members who were developing policy 
statements or preparing legislation. They used our research 
reports in developing new legislative proposals.
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As suggested earlier, it is almost impossible to determine 
which research results help to shape policy decisions. Nor is 
it possible to predict, in advance, what impact research find 
ings will have on policy. The single research study funded by 
the Office of Research and Development, which probably 
had the greatest immediate and traceable impact on public 
and private policy was a modestly funded study of the 
reasons for the low level of black participation in appren 
ticeship programs. 9
The findings of this study, which documented the reasons 
why so few blacks were in apprenticeship and described the 
methods used to bar their entry, resulted in a sharp and im 
mediate redirection of the program of the Bureau of Appren 
ticeship and Training and changed the apprenticeship selec 
tion system of unions and employers. The results were used 
by public agencies and private interest groups concerned 
with equal employment opportunities. Based on this study, 
the Department of Labor funded action programs designed 
to assist minorities in entering apprenticeship programs. The 
findings and their use in programs of this research project 
were probably the primary reason for the large increase of 
black participation in apprenticeship programs during the 
1960s and 1970s.
Apparently, an unusual combination of factors con 
tributed to the acceptance and immediate use of this study of 
the apprenticeship system. The right questions were evident 
ly asked at a time in history when there was a receptive au 
dience of public and private policymakers who were willing 
to act on the research findings. It coincided with a civil rights 
movement that was seeking targets. No one could have 
predicted in advance that this small research project would 
have had such a far-reaching impact on policy. Certainly, 
one cannot generalize about policy-oriented research based 
on this and hundreds of other projects. The combination of 
levels of funding, subjects studied, questions asked, the 
receptivity of policymakers, timing and the temper of the
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times are not too helpful in anticipating the impact of 
research on policy.
When the research program was 10 years old, the Depart 
ment of Labor asked the National Academy of Sciences- 
National Research Council to establish a committee to 
review, assess and make recommendations regarding the 
manpower research and development program. Among the 
topics covered by the committee was the " relevance of the 
Department's R&D efforts to ... influence . . . the 
development of national manpower and related policies and 
programs. . . ." 10 After analyzing a sample of almost 1,000 
projects funded by the Office of Research and Development 
between 1963 and 1975, commissioning papers on specific 
aspects of the ORD program and conducting 375 interviews, 
the committee concluded that the "manpower R&D program 
has made a number of outstanding contributions to 
policy. . . ." n
The committee reported that ORD had been instrumental 
in identifying and exploring the complexities of manpower 
problems. It referred specifically to our work on job vacan 
cies, projections of future manpower requirements, the 
nature and extent of occupational training of the nation's 
labor force, the spatial and occupational distribution of 
unemployment and underemployment and the employment 
experience of minority workers and the economically and 
socially disadvantaged. Studies of labor market deficiencies, 
including the adverse effects of occupational licensing, 
employment discrimination and the development of new 
theories to illuminate complexities of labor market opera 
tions were also cited as examples of research and develop 
ment projects influencing policy and programs. The commit 
tee noted the realities of the research office's existence in an 
operationally oriented federal department subject to fre 
quent shifts in policy. As a result of the committee's inter 
views, it found only scant acceptance among department of 
ficials "of the need for comprehensive, extended efforts aim-
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ed at better understanding fundamental and persistent man 
power problems." 12
To summarize our experience in policy-oriented research, 
we would conclude that the design of a social science 
research program which can be useful to policymakers in a 
mission-oriented agency is probably the greatest challenge 
faced by research administrators. The turnover of political 
appointees, many of whom take government positions with 
preconceived biases and special agendas, the general lack of 
interest in long term research and frequent changes in 
priorities and legislation all reduce the potential contribution 
of social research to the policymaking process. In spite of 
these difficulties, a research administrator must constantly 
explore ways of bringing valid research findings to the atten 
tion of decisionmakers.
Disappointments and Accomplishments
In reviewing 18 years of experience as an administrator of 
a federal research and development program, I should like to 
first comment on some of my disappointments. I fear that 
little can be done about my negative conclusions.
Let me again start with the caveat that my comments on 
political leadership apply to both political parties. The 
Department of Labor was quite fortunate in being ad 
ministered by political appointees between 1962 and 1980 
who, for the most part, if not interested in social science 
research at least tolerated it. Unfortunately, our political 
system often brings appointees into the government who not 
only know very little about the programs they are to ad 
minister but who are unable to use social science research 
findings in making policy decisions. Communicating the ob 
jective results of research findings to some political ap 
pointees was sometimes a futile exercise. I see little 
likelihood in the foreseeable future that presidents will ever 
make selections of political appointees on the basis of their 
program knowledge or their ability to use research findings.
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My second major disappointment was with the social 
science research community. Most of the social scientists 
who applied for research funding to the Office of Research 
and Development seemed to be unaware that they were ap 
proaching a research organization in a mission-oriented 
agency. Many of them never took the time to read the law 
under which we operated.
Our graduate educational system seems to turn out too 
many researchers who are concerned with methodology, 
model building, and discipline-oriented research that is of lit 
tle use to those concerned with the nation's economic and 
social problems. Our educational system seems to destroy 
whatever creativity or innovativeness students may have 
before they become researchers. Too many social scientists 
do not recognize that social research is cumulative and often 
requires long term commitment on the part of the researcher. 
Again, as with political appointees, I foresee little possibility 
in the near future of improvement in the training of social 
scientists. Graduate schools will continue to produce too 
many narrow discipline-oriented researchers, most of whom 
will have little interest in applying their research skills to real 
world problems.
What did we accomplish in 18 years of the research and 
development program?
In order to attempt to answer this question I refer to a 
16-year compilation of research and development projects. 13 
I was first struck by the enormous diversity of our interests. 
Our projects covered almost every subject in the employment 
and training field. Second, although we made considerable 
investments in applied program research, we still managed to 
support basic research. Third, we funded a large number of 
assessment and evaluation projects which provided 
policymakers with objective data on the effectiveness of 
Department of Labor programs. If one wanted to get infor 
mation to criticize DOL's work, one simply could turn to the 
research findings of projects funded by a neutral, profes-
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sional social science research program conducted by a 
federal agency. Fourth, the true meaning of cumulative 
research became apparent in tracing projects that slowly 
built on previous research findings. Our studies of illegal im 
migrants, discrimination, occupational licensing, employ 
ment problems of ex-offenders, barriers to employment and 
other labor market operation projects were supported over 
10-year periods. The continuity of support and the commit 
ment of researchers to particular subject areas effectively 
build a bank of information on important social and 
economic problems. Fifth, our intensive concentration on 
certain issues is certainly impressive. For example, our early 
research predicted that important social and economic 
developments were changing the work pattern and life style 
of American women.
During the first 16 years of the program, some 128 pro 
jects were funded to examine the work and employment 
problems of women workers. The subjects studied ranged 
from women in nontraditional blue-collar jobs, maternity 
leave benefits, child care arrangements of working mothers, 
labor force mobility of women, the effects of marriage and 
divorce on labor force participation, fertility and career pat 
terns, dual careers, minority women in white-collar jobs, 
female heads of families, marital status and occupational 
mobility of women, econometric analysis of the part-time 
labor market for women and career patterns of women 
physicians. These research studies combined with experimen 
tal and developmental projects designed to break new 
ground for women in the labor market can be considered a 
major accomplishment of the program.
As noted earlier, our research and development work con 
tributed to a broader understanding of the employment 
problems of the economically disadvantaged of our society. 
Exploratory studies of unemployment in the ghetto changed 
the data collection system of BLS and the Census Bureau. A 
series of studies of the employment problems of ex-offenders
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led to changes in questions on job application forms of state 
and local government about arrest records. Much of our 
work was translated into legislative amendments and the in 
troduction of new concepts in legislation.
The development and continuing support of the National 
Longitudinal Surveys has provided the country with new in 
formation about the employment experience of our 
workforce, the effect of health on work and retirement, 
labor force participation of women, discrimination, at 
titudes toward work and the result of inadequate labor 
market knowledge on the earnings and careers of minority 
youth. The longitudinal nature of these surveys has given us, 
for the first time, predictive tools and a broader under 
standing of how social and cultural changes affect work pat 
terns.
Our efforts to improve the methodologies used to assess 
social programs should provide more valid findings for the 
use of policymakers. In my view, the emphasis we placed on 
the use of random assignments, control groups, cost ac 
counting, adequate samples and the professional manage 
ment of experimental and demonstration projects con 
tributed to the improvement of the state of art of experimen 
tal and demonstration projects. We believe that the Sup 
ported Work model established a landmark for future 
research demonstration projects.
The grant and institutional support programs played a 
central role in increasing the number and improving the 
quality of researchers active in the field of employment and 
training. Well over 500 recipients of grants completed their 
doctorates. The institutional grant program, which funded 
undergraduate study and self-directed faculty research 
helped increase academically-based research centers.
One final reflection: the management of a program involv 
ing thousands of projects and millions of dollars of federal 
funds is obviously not a one-person job. The quality and ef 
fectiveness of the research and development program
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depended on the small number of career servants who con 
ducted the day-to-day operations of soliciting, developing 
and reviewing proposals, handling the onerous details 
associated with government contracts and grants, monitor 
ing projects and planning utilization strategy. These 
employees had to combine practical managerial skill with a 
professional knowledge of the social sciences. Praising 
government employees is not a popular pastime in 
Washington in 1984. But I would be remiss if I did not pay 
tribute to the professionalism, conscientiousness and dedica 
tion of the federal employees who contributed to the success 
of the Employment and Training Administration's research 
and development program.
Washington is noted for the short term careers of political 
appointees who leave few lasting reminders of their 
ephemeral fame. In contrast, the civil servants who par 
ticipated in ETA's research and development program can 
rest assured that they have left a lasting legacy of knowledge 
and information which has had and will continue to have an 
impact on some of this country's most complex social and 
economic problems.
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Social experimentation began in earnest when the New 
Jersey negative income tax experiment was launched in 1967. 
For the next 14 years, government agencies and philan 
thropic organizations sponsored a wide variety of ex 
periments and demonstrations involving innovations in 
social policy; none were more important than those concern 
ing the controversial income support-work issue. In this 
paper we consider three of the most important social policy 
experiments: the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Ex 
periment, the National Supported Work Demonstration, 
and the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project. These pro 
jects have yielded findings of broad significance to social 
policy, though the significance of their findings is only dimly 
perceived by policymakers and interested scholars. Our pur 
pose in this review is to briefly describe the experiments and 
state the main policy conclusions that can be drawn from 
them. In our final section, we will discuss some conclusions 
about the effects and value of social experiments in general.
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The Seattle-Denver Experiment
The Seattle-Denver experiment was the largest and most 
comprehensive of the Negative Income Tax (NIT) ex 
periments. It was begun in Seattle in 1970 and in Denver in 
1971 under contracts between the States of Washington and 
Colorado and the U.S. Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare. The experiment was administered by 
Mathematica, a research organization that had already gain 
ed valuable administrative experience running the New 
Jersey experiment. The Stanford Research Institute designed 
the experiment and was given major responsibility for 
evaluating it. There is no doubt that the Seattle-Denver ex 
periment was the best run of the NIT experiments, and it was 
the most thoroughly studied.
Approximately 4800 families were enrolled in the experi 
ment, and families assigned to experimental NIT plans were 
potentially eligible for payments for a period of either three 
or five years. 1 To be eligible for enrollment, families had to 
contain at least one ablebodied, nonaged adult. If only a 
single adult was present, the family was also required to have 
one or more dependent children. The sample enrolled in the 
experiment consisted of lower- and middle-income black, 
white, and Hispanic families with either one or two parents 
present. While participation was restricted to residents of 
Seattle and Denver, families could continue to participate if 
they moved out of those cities.
The experiment had two main goals, both of which were 
reflected in its rather elaborate design. The first was to deter 
mine the effect of alternative NIT plans on the work 
behavior of the poor. The second was to test the feasibility 
and effectiveness of educational vouchers aimed at low- 
income workers.
The idea behind a negative income tax is fairly well-known 
and will not be discussed in detail here. In its simplest form,
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a NIT offers a guaranteed monthly or annual income to a 
family that has no other income of its own. This amount 
varies depending on the number of persons in the family and 
was systematically varied in the experiment to measure the 
impact of higher or lower income support levels. If a family 
receives income from nonexperimental sources, such as wage 
earnings, interest, or public transfers, the monthly NIT pay 
ment is reduced in proportion to the amount of other income 
received. As income from other sources rises, the NIT pay 
ment is reduced by an amount determined by the program's 
tax (or benefit reduction) rate. The tax rate was also 
systematically varied in the experiment. When income from 
other sources is sufficiently high that the benefit reduction 
exactly offsets the income guarantee—at a point known as 
the break-even—payments under a NIT cease. A NIT's 
break-even level is algebraically determined by its guarantee 
and tax rate. As the guarantee level rises, the break-even also 
rises; as the tax rate rises, the break-even level declines.
Both theory and common sense suggest that the transfer 
scheme just described will affect work effort. Those who 
receive payments will have more income, so the necessity for 
earned income falls. Because payments are reduced as earned 
income rises, the reward for work is also affected. Under a 
benefit reduction rate of 70 percent, for example, a recipient 
who earns an additional dollar loses $0.70 in NIT benefits, 
and the net increase in income is only $0.30. The Seattle- 
Denver experiment tested 11 NIT plans with income 
guarantees ranging from slightly below to about 40 percent 
above the poverty threshold and tax rates ranging from 
about 50 to 70 percent. With this range of tested guarantees 
and tax rates, the designers hoped to detect the impact of a 
meaningful array of plans. In retrospect, we can criticize the 
designers for their conservative assessment of the meaningful 
range of tax rates. The policy debate since 1977, and 
especially since 1981, has shown that tax rates in excess of 90
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percent or even 100 percent are well within the policy- 
relevant range.
The random assignment of families or individuals to alter 
native treatments—or no treatment at all—is what gives 
social experimentation its unique advantage as a tool for 
policy analysis. With only a few modest and believable 
statistical assumptions, it is possible for the analyst of ex 
perimental data to establish a definite cause-and-effect rela 
tionship between treatment variations and observed out 
comes. The direction and precise magnitude of the relation 
ship can be established with known levels of statistical con 
fidence. In the case of the Seattle-Denver experiment, 
families were randomly assigned to 1 out of the 11 tested 
NIT plans or to control status. A family enrolled in one of 
the NIT plans was eligible to receive NIT grants if its income 
was below the plan's break-even. A family in the control 
group was not eligible to receive these experimental transfers 
but could continue to receive any nonexperimental transfers 
for which it remained eligible. The effect of the NIT plans on 
work behavior can be reliably determined simply by 
statistically comparing the work effort of individuals enroll 
ed in the various plans and in the control group.
The work-effort findings from the Seattle-Denver experi 
ment have been summarized in a final report recently issued 
by the Department of Health and Human Services. Briefly, 
the report shows that the tested NIT plans caused substantial 
reductions in labor market activity, particularly for persons 
enrolled in longer duration (5-year) plans and for women. By 
"substantial" we mean that prime-aged men reduced their 
annual hours of work by 9 or 10 percent; that their spouses 
reduced annual hours by 17 to 20 percent; and that women 
heading single-parent families reduced annual hours by more 
than 20 percent—perhaps by as much as 28 to 32 percent. 2 
These reported work reductions are large enough to cause 
alarm among conservatives already opposed to a NIT and
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even among centrists with no strong opinions about the 
desirability of a NIT.
Taken by themselves, however, the work reductions just 
reported have almost nothing to tell us about the desirability 
or feasibility of enacting a NIT. The work reductions appear 
to be fairly substantial, but the work disincentive provided 
by the tested plans was also quite substantial, larger in fact 
than that which would be provided under most proposed 
NIT plans. The Seattle-Denver plans tested an average in 
come guarantee of 115 percent of the poverty threshold and 
a marginal tax averaging only about 50 percent. In addition, 
the experiment provided rebates for state, federal, and PICA 
taxes on earned income. About 80 percent of enrolled 
families faced a break-even level that was more than one- 
and-a-half times the poverty threshold, and 50 percent faced 
a break-even more than twice the poverty level (that is, above 
$19,600 for a family of four in 1982 dollars). By contrast, the 
combined income guarantee provided by AFDC and food 
stamps is now below the poverty level in most states, and the 
break-even level for AFDC is below the poverty level in all 
but 15 states. 3
Even so, the labor supply findings from Seattle-Denver 
were considered sufficiently important to affect the welfare 
reform proposals submitted by the Carter Administration. 4 
The reason was quite simple. The results showed quite con 
vincingly that the work incentive provided by a NIT's low 
marginal tax rate was more than offset by the work disincen 
tive effects caused by higher overall transfers. For example, 
simulations based upon the Seattle-Denver results 
demonstrated that replacement of the current welfare and 
food stamp programs with a national NIT that has a 
guarantee equal to three-quarters of the poverty line and a 
marginal tax rate of 50 percent would reduce aggregate labor 
supply in two-parent families by about 1 percent. Labor sup 
ply in two-parent families with annual incomes below $5,000
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would be reduced by more than 8 percent. 3 Although we do 
not find these estimates discouraging by themselves, they 
contain an implication that is dispiriting to policymakers 
who wish to simultaneously support incomes and increase 
the self-reliance of needy families. According to the Seattle- 
Denver estimates, under the NIT plan just described it would 
cost the government $1.79 in transfer outlays to raise the net 
income of poor two-parent families by $1.00. In other 
words, 44 percent of the net program costs of the NIT would 
be "consumed" by breadwinners in the form of leisure. (The 
net program cost of the NIT is the amount by which NIT 
transfers exceed those now paid under the welfare and food 
stamp programs.)
Another important—though at first glance, per 
verse—result from the experiment was that lowering work 
incentives in transfer programs by raising their marginal tax 
rates (holding the guarantee constant) serves to increase ag 
gregate work effort. For example, if the tax rate in the NIT 
just described were raised from 50 to 70 percent, the Seattle- 
Denver results indicated that aggregate work effort would 
rise by 1 percent. 6 The result is attributable to the fact that 
while increases in marginal tax rates may indeed reduce the 
work effort of continued transfer recipients, that effect is 
more than outweighed by the increases in work effort that 
occur among those who lose benefits altogether. (Recall that 
a rise in the marginal tax rate with a constant guarantee 
causes a fall in the break-even and hence a reduction in the 
number of transfer recipients.)
If one's sole objective is to increase work effort, the recent 
increases in AFDC tax rates might conceivably be justified 
by findings of the Seattle-Denver experiment. 7 This conclu 
sion, however, rests on the premise that the main objective 
of transfer policy is to encourage work effort. In fact, the 
primary objective of a NIT is to protect the living standards 
of people who would otherwise be destitute, and to do so in
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an equitable and efficient way. The contribution of the NIT 
program to this objective, it should be noted, has received 
only slight attention in the hundreds of research reports filed 
on the NIT experiments. This in spite of the fact that the 
tested NIT plans were potentially quite effective in attaining 
that goal. Nevertheless, the Seattle-Denver experiment has 
played the useful role of overturning the notion, especially 
popular among economists and idealistic reformers, that 
lower marginal tax rates are automatically associated with a 
greater stimulus to work.
The second objective of the experiment was to test the ef 
fectiveness of issuing education and training vouchers to 
low-income breadwinners. Families in the experiment were 
randomly assigned to one of three employment-training pro 
grams or to control status. 8 All three of the labor market 
programs provided a structured course of manpower 
counseling to help participants decide on an appropriate 
strategy of employment, education, and training. This 
course was voluntary, informational in content, and non- 
directive (that is, participants were not encouraged to pursue 
any particular course of action). One of the tested programs 
offered no service beyond this counseling. The other two of 
fered subsidies to pay for some or all of the direct costs of 
schooling or training. 9 Two levels of voucher subsidy were 
tested. In the more generous plan, 100 percent of direct 
training costs were reimbursed by the experiment. In the 
other plan, only 50 percent of costs were reimbursed. Par 
ticipants could use their vouchers to pay for any education or 
training they chose, so long as it was at least tangentially 
related to improving their future job prospects.
The purpose of the vouchers was to encourage eligible 
breadwinners to invest in worthwhile training and education, 
which according to human capital theory should have im 
proved participants' employability and future earnings. Par 
ticipation in the program was reasonably high. About one-
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fifth of family heads in two-parent families used the 50 per 
cent vouchers, and over one-third used the 100 percent 
vouchers. About one-third of single mothers eligible for the 
50 percent vouchers used them, as did nearly one-half of 
those eligible for the 100 percent vouchers. Not surprisingly, 
much of the subsidy went to pay for schooling that would 
have been obtained in the absence of the program. Most of 
the subsidies paid for attendance in formal academic pro 
grams, such as those run by community colleges, rather than 
for technical training. The more generous subsidy program 
succeeded in encouraging extra investment in formal school 
ing, with the rise averaging about one-half an academic 
quarter among men eligible for the subsidies and about one 
to one-and-one-half extra quarters among eligible women. 10
The interesting finding from this experiment is the com 
plete lack of evidence that the increased investment in 
schooling by participants led to any pay-off in the job 
market. On the contrary, persons eligible for vouchers—in 
comparison to control-group members—suffered short term 
reductions in wage rates, earnings, and employment during 
the initial phase of their eligibility. And they never showed 
consistent earnings gains over the entire 6-year span for 
which information is available, a period which includes a 
fairly lengthy spell in which participants had completed their 
schooling. 11 One explanation for this result is that the 
vouchers induced significant short term reductions in work 
effort and work intensity by subsidizing an alternative use of 
time—enrollment in formal schooling. After the training was 
completed, participants' earnings failed to rise above the 
level observed in the control group because of the amount 
and character of extra schooling obtained. The amount of 
extra schooling was on average very small, and it was ap 
parently not particularly relevant to the participants' labor 
market situation. A second explanation concerns the effect 
of a rather poor and generally deteriorating labor market on
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the earnings potential of those who reduce (or cease) their 
work in order to obtain additional schooling. In such a labor 
market, the returns to work experience and job-keeping may 
be in excess of those to increased schooling. It is difficult to 
make training pay off if there are few jobs available.
Employment and training programs for the poor are 
sometimes criticized for being too rigid, too bureaucratic, 
too paternalistic, and too insensitive to the special needs of 
different clients. The experimental test of manpower 
vouchers in Seattle and Denver shows that completely decen 
tralized decisionmaking, an approach often advocated by 
economists, may not be an effective substitute for our pre 
sent arrangements, at least in the face of low labor demand. 
When given the resources and freedom to choose their own 
training strategy, low-income breadwinners appear to be no 
better at selecting a winning strategy than are the ad 
ministrators and training specialists who now run training 
and employment programs.
The National Supported Work Demonstration
The 1970's commitment to assist hard-to-employ workers 
in finding jobs is perhaps best illustrated by the Supported 
Work Program. The program was a research and demonstra 
tion program, rather than a comprehensive employment pro 
gram. It began in 1975 and was, from its inception, schedul 
ed to last five years. Its basic objective was to provide in 
dividuals who had severe employment problems with work 
experience of about one year. The work experience was pro 
vided under conditions of gradually increasing demands, 
close supervision, and work in association with a crew of 
peers. The guiding principle of the demonstration was that 
"... by participating in the program, a significant number 
of people who are severely handicapped for employment 
may be able to join the labor force and do productive work,
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cease engaging in socially destructive or dependent behavior, 
and become self-supporting members of society." 12
Four groups of employment-handicapped workers were 
eligible for the program: female long term recipients of 
AFDC, convicts recently released from prison, former drug 
addicts, and young school dropouts who often had a delin 
quency record. Fifteen sites were chosen for the program. 
While each site was given responsibility for defining the type 
of work on which it would focus and the source of local 
funds on which it would draw, the entire program had a 
common research-evaluation emphasis. Hence, a variety of 
factors were standardized across the 15 sites. These included 
the basic program design of low supervisor-participant 
ratios, steadily increasing standards of attendance, punc 
tuality, and productivity, crew work and peer group support, 
and common eligibility criteria, wage rates, and employment 
duration. Like the Seattle-Denver experiment, the Supported 
Work Demonstration used a rigorous experimental design 
involving the random assignment of applicants to ex 
perimental (participant) and control (nonparticipant com 
parison) groups. We can therefore place substantial con 
fidence in the demonstration's findings.
Over its 5-year life, the demonstration provided services to 
over 10,000 persons, although at any point in time the 
number of participants at any site was limited to 300. The 
evaluation of the demonstration was based on interviews 
with 3,214 participants and 3,402 controls. Each person in 
the research sample was interviewed prior to participation 
and given up to four additional interviews at 9-month inter 
vals.
The participants suffered severe employment handicaps. 
Fewer than one-third had graduated from high school, most 
were black or Hispanic, fewer than one-quarter were mar 
ried, the number weeks worked in the year prior to enroll-
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ment averaged six or seven, and (except for the female 
welfare group) arrest rates ranged from 54 to 100 percent. 
The work provided varied across sites, but included home 
rehabilitation, recapping tires, building furniture, and 
operating day care centers. Some program outputs were sold 
in the market in order to raise revenues for the program.
The program performance of the four enrolled groups 
varied considerably. Supported Work proved most effective 
in preparing the welfare women who had least work ex 
perience for gainful employment. It also had a significant 
impact on the ex-addict group. For the ex-offender group, 
the results were marginal and not statistically significant, 
while no long term positive results were found for the group 
of young dropouts. Overall, the participants in the program 
stayed an average of 6.7 months, even though the goal of the 
demonstration was about 12 months of participation. Thirty 
percent of the participants were fired because of poor perfor 
mance; an equivalent number, however, moved on to full- 
time regular jobs. (The successful transition rate improved 
steadily over the course of the program.) About 10 percent 
of the participants (25 percent of the long term welfare 
women) had to be released after 12 months of participation, 
because their maximum permissible program stay had been 
attained. The average cost to the public per recipient was 
$5,740, but because most participants stayed in the program 
less than one year, the average cost per service year was over 
$10,000. This cost declined steadily over the five years of the 
demonstration and is about the same as the service-year cost 
in another targeted training program, Job Corps.
The program had a variety of impacts on its participants in 
areas ranging from drug use and criminal activity to employ 
ment behavior and welfare dependency. The AFDC group 
showed the most consistently positive response to the 
demonstration. In this group, participation was associated 
with increases in employment rate, hours worked, and earn-
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ings, both during and after the period of program participa 
tion. In addition, there was a significant reduction in welfare 
dependency as well as reduction in the average amount of 
food stamps and other transfers received. The welfare 
women helped most by Supported Work tended to be older 
(between 36 and 44), to be less educated, to have been on 
welfare for a longer period, and to have little or no prior 
work experience. At least the last three of these effects would 
have been difficult to predict prior to the program, and in 
deed are somewhat surprising.
Among ex-addicts the demonstration raised employment 
and reduced criminal activity, but failed to have a statistical 
ly significant impact on drug use. The main impact on 
criminal activity seems to have been concentrated in the first 
18 months after enrollment in the demonstration. The 
demonstration's effect on employment probably persisted 
for longer than that. Ex-convicts in the demonstration do 
not seem to have been helped as much as the two groups just 
mentioned. The demonstration did not affect employment, 
welfare dependence, drug use, or criminal activity after par 
ticipation ended. Similarly, the youth enrollees were not 
helped much, if at all, by the program. In this case, however, 
the evaluators found evidence that the target group was 
probably more employable than originally believed. At some 
time during the period of the study, between 80 and 90 per 
cent of youth dropouts in the control group held a job. This 
level far exceeds the rate of the other three control groups 
studied, indicating that the youth group was less disadvan- 
taged than the other target groups enrolled.
The Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation and 
Mathematica conducted a very careful benefit-cost evalua 
tion of the demonstration. They computed the benefits and 
costs of the program from three different perspectives—that 
of program participants, that of taxpayers, and that of socie 
ty as a whole (participants and taxpayers). The social
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benefits include the output produced by workers in the pro 
gram, increases in their post-program earnings, reductions in 
criminal activities, and savings from reduced participation in 
other public employment, training, or drug treatment pro 
grams. The social costs include all program operating costs 
(excluding transfer payments, however, because these are 
simply a redistribution of income). The benefit-cost tabula 
tions were based on extrapolations over the typical working 
life of the participants, with benefits assumed to decay at a 
rate of 50 percent every five years except among AFDC 
mothers where no decay rate in benefits is assumed.
The benefit-cost analysis showed that the demonstration 
had considerable net social payoff for the welfare mothers 
enrolled, primarily due to the long term earnings gains 
assumed and the value of the output from the demonstration 
jobs. Benefits also exceeded costs for the ex-addicts, in large 
part because of the reduction in socially destructive behavior 
(i.e., crime) and the gains in employment and earnings. For 
ex-convicts the results were less conclusive. The net benefit 
of the program may have been positive or negative depend 
ing on the assumptions used to value the benefits of the pro 
gram. Not surprisingly in view of the estimated impact of the 
demonstration on youths, the program's cost was found to 
outweigh its benefits for the youth dropout group.
Because of the very specific nature of the treatment tested 
in the Supported Work Demonstration, it is difficult to draw 
broad policy conclusions from its results. The finding that 
the Supported Work approach had its greatest payoff in the 
case of AFDC mothers is consistent with a few other findings 
from the last decade of research on training and employment 
programs. Some of the studies of the Continuous 
Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS) have also conclud 
ed that disadvantaged women helped by CETA appear to ob 
tain the greatest program benefit. Similarly, in the Seattle- 
Denver experiment, the only group to show a positive impact
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from the counseling program (as distinct from the voucher 
program) was the sample of unmarried women with 
children. Also, as we shall see below, the Employment Op 
portunity Pilot Project appeared to have a more consistently 
and significantly positive effect on unmarried women than 
on other groups served. It would thus appear that single 
mothers are more susceptible to being helped by public train 
ing and employment efforts than other groups of hard-to- 
employ workers.
The Employment Opportunity Pilot Project
The history of the Employment Opportunity Pilot Pro 
ject—or EOPP—was a tumultuous one, marked by shifting 
objectives and premature cancellation. It is said that we learn 
from our mistakes. If this were true, EOPP should have been 
one of the most richly informative demonstrations ever 
undertaken. The project was begun by the Carter Ad 
ministration in order to estimate participation rates and 
potential effects of a guaranteed jobs program similar to that 
proposed in Carter's welfare reform package. Alarmed by 
the work effort reductions estimated in the Seattle-Denver 
experiment, the Administration was determined to limit the 
work disincentive effects of its welfare proposal by requiring 
certain welfare recipients to accept public service employ 
ment (PSE) if they were unable to obtain unsubsidized jobs. 
The President's welfare reform efforts were twice rebuffed 
by Congress, but his PSE proposals were treated more sym 
pathetically. In 1978 Congress permitted the Department of 
Labor to set up a 14-site pilot test of a guaranteed jobs pro 
gram.
Even before the first EOPP enrollments took place in 
1979, the basic objectives of the demonstration had already 
been modified. This was due in part to the Administration's 
evolving objectives in reforming welfare and GET A. In addi 
tion to simply providing a test of the guaranteed jobs con-
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cept, which was expected to be very expensive, the architects 
of EOPP also hoped to test new approaches to job finding 
among the hard-core unemployed. If applicants for PSE 
jobs could be required to participate in intensive and struc 
tured programs of job finding, and if those programs turned 
out to be successful, the "demand" for PSE job slots, and 
hence the cost of PSE, could be limited.
At the time the demonstration began in 1979, its objective 
was to determine whether a program that provided a com 
bination of ". . . job search assistance and subsidized 
employment and training could succeed in increasing the 
employment and, hence, reducing the welfare dependence of 
adults in low-income families with children. The program, 
targeted primarily toward families that were receiving 
AFDC, provided participants with intensive job search 
assistance and support services, such as child care and 
transportation assistance. Participants who were unsuc 
cessful at finding an unsubsidized job after a'prescribed 
period of active search were offered a subsidized job or 
training." 13
When President Reagan took office in 1981, the goals of 
the program, or at least the focus of the program evaluation, 
shifted once again. The new Administration wished to 
abolish public service jobs, not to pilot test a program that 
guaranteed them. It emphatically signaled this goal by end 
ing enrollments into EOPP's PSE jobs program, sharply 
curtailing enrollment in other components of the EOPP pro 
gram, and prematurely terminating the entire project in Oc 
tober 1981, less than two-and-one-half years after operations 
began in 1979. Mathematica, the prime research contractor 
for the project, was directed to discover the impact, if any, 
of EOPP's job search assistance program and to provide a 
cost-benefit analysis of that program.
The implementation of EOPP and its evaluation were 
seriously harmed by these shifts in program objective. The
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original research and implementation design of EOPP was 
sensible for a pilot test of a guaranteed jobs program. 
However, it was extremely deficient for evaluating alter 
native approaches to job search assistance, the goal em 
phasized in the final evaluation contract. The available con 
trol group was ill-suited to examining job search assistance. 
To evaluate a guaranteed jobs program it is necessary to con 
duct saturation demonstrations under a variety of local labor 
market conditions. By saturation demonstrations we mean 
that the program had to be offered on an unlimited basis to 
all income-eligible families in a particular community. 
Saturation was required in order to determine participation 
rates in a well-publicized program and, equally important, to 
see whether such a program would seriously disrupt local 
labor markets by driving down the available supply of labor 
for unsubsidized employment. To see how local labor 
market conditions were affected by EOPP, it was necessary 
to obtain a basis for comparison. Mathematica and DOL of 
ficials selected 14 comparison sites to be used as a "control 
group" for the 14 pilot sites in the demonstration. (Because 
"control sites" were selected, EOPP might arguably be call 
ed an experiment rather than a demonstration project. 
However, eligibility for treatment was not randomly assign 
ed to individuals except in Dayton and Philadelphia, and 
hence the project was probably closer to an ordinary 
demonstration than to a formal social experiment.) This 
strategy required massive amounts of household interview 
ing in both pilot and comparison sites.
Only a small proportion of these household interviews 
would have been needed for an adequate assessment of the 
job search assistance program by itself. Moreover, the ex 
perimental and control groups should have been randomly 
selected from the eligible population in the pilot sites. In 
deed, for testing job search assistance, an experimental 
design involving at most a few thousand participants and 
controls in selected labor market environments is all that
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would have been required. Neither saturation, nor multiple 
control sites, nor massive interviewing would have been 
necessary.
EOPP was adminstered by the state and local officials 
(prime sponsors) responsible for administering local CETA 
programs. The competence and commitment of local ad 
ministrators thus varied considerably. The prime sponsors 
were responsible for publicizing the availability of EOPP 
services, identifying, recruiting, and determining the 
technical eligibility of potential clients, providing support 
services like child care for enrolled participants, establishing 
and administering a structured program of job search 
assistance, and providing public service jobs, work ex 
perience slots, and classroom and on-the-job training oppor 
tunities for clients unable to obtain unsubsidized employ 
ment. The broad character of program responsibilities and 
the potential for administrative discretion at each point are 
noteworthy, and they threaten the reliability of evaluation 
findings. We simply cannot be confident about the exact 
nature of the treatment as delivered in the field.
EOPP tested self-directed job search methods that are 
quite distinct from the job referral and job development 
techniques usually used in the Employment Service or 
CETA. Clients were taught effective methods of job search 
and encouraged to follow a rigorous and structured routine 
in looking for employment. People who could not find un 
subsidized jobs in five to eight weeks were offered a subsidiz 
ed employment or training position, which could last up to 
one year before workers or trainees were recycled through 
the job search assistance program. Workers in PSE jobs and 
OJT training positions were paid regular wages, while those 
in work experience or classroom training slots were given a 
weekly training stipend.
To be eligible for EOPP job search assistance, applicants 
had to be adult members of families that included one or
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more children and that either received AFDC or had income 
below 70 percent of BLS's Lower Living Standard. To be 
eligibile for subsidized employment or training, individuals 
were required to complete the job search phase of the pro 
gram without obtaining unsubsidized employment and, in 
addition, be the family's primary earner and either receive 
AFDC or have low enough income to qualify for AFDC. In 
most sites the program was aimed primarily at adult AFDC 
recipients.
Mathematica's evaluation of EOPP covers only 10 of the 
14 communities involved in the demonstration. In those ten 
communities it is estimated that over 190,000 adults were 
eligible for EOPP services at some point during the 
demonstration. 14 However, of that total only 120,000 were 
eligible for the full range of EOPP services, including sub 
sidized employment and training. Only 21,000—or 18 
percent—of those fully eligible chose to enroll in EOPP. An 
additional 2,000 adults eligible only for job search assistance 
also enrolled in the program. 15 Of those individuals who fill 
ed out the forms to enroll, only about 62 percent remained in 
the program long enough to receive some job search 
assistance. One-third of the people receiving job search help 
obtained an unsubsidized job. Only 4,100—or 17 percent of 
enrollees—remained with the program long enough to 
receive subsidized employment or training, of which approx 
imately two-thirds were assigned to PSE jobs. 16 Thus, of the 
120,000 potential participants in EOPP's "guaranteed jobs" 
program, fewer than 3 percent actually obtained PSE jobs.
The striking feature of these statistics is the very small pro 
portion of program eligibles who actually received program 
services, especially very expensive services like subsidized 
jobs and training. This suggests that a guaranteed public 
jobs program aimed at the welfare-eligible poor would be 
considerably less expensive than anticipated by the Carter 
Administration, which expected a much higher participation
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rate. On the other hand, the program would also be much 
less successful than expected in reducing welfare 
dependence, since only a small percentage of AFDC reci 
pients would apparently be forced to participate in such a 
program. 17 In part the low participation rate in the jobs pro 
gram was attributable to uncertain guidelines from the 
Labor Department, poor program administration at the 
local level, normal start-up problems, and a lack of publicity 
for the program. Even with these problems it was 
astonishing to program operators that so small a proportion 
of obviously eligible people chose to enroll. Among AFDC 
recipients who were mandatory participants in the WIN pro 
gram (and thus likely to be ready to hold a job), only one- 
third enrolled in EOPP, and the availability of EOPP was 
widely advertised among that group. 18 Among nonrecipients 
of AFDC who were eligible for EOPP PSE jobs, only 8 per 
cent enrolled in the EOPP program. 19
In view of the apparently generous offer provided by the 
program, this studied indifference to EOPP is interesting. Of 
course, it is possible to keep enthusiasm for public jobs down 
by erecting enough bureaucratic hurdles—a complex and 
lengthy application process, mandatory participation in a 
job search program, and potentially lengthy delays before 
assignment to a PSE job. Nonetheless, it appears that the at 
tractiveness of a temporary PSE job paying between one and 
two times the minimum wage is not nearly as great as 
sometimes assumed. Even though EOPP provided a highly 
imperfect test, the administration of the demonstration was 
probably not perceptibly inferior to what would be provided 
in an on-going program. The local administrators of the pro 
gram were after all the same people responsible for ad 
ministering CETA and are probably now running training 
and referral programs under JTPA. If there is any future 
consideration of a guaranteed jobs program for welfare reci 
pients, EOPP has taught us that both the costs and benefits
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will be considerably below what was expected in the 
mid-1970s.
What of the other objectives of the project? The evalua 
tion contractor concluded that the job search assistance pro 
gram run by EOPP was probably effective in helping par 
ticipants find jobs. Enrollees in the job search assistance pro 
gram increased the amount and effectiveness of their search 
efforts. In comparison to unemployed workers in the target 
population who did not enroll in EOPP, participants spent 
nearly twice as many hours a week searching for a job, con 
tacted about four times as many potential employers, and fil 
ed approximately 75 percent more formal job applications. 20 
As mentioned earlier, about one-third of enrollees receiving 
job search help landed an unsubsidized job. Although it is 
unclear how much of an improvement is indicated by this 
placement rate, Mathematica concluded that for the largest 
group of enrollees—single mothers—EOPP probably raised 
the employment rate by 10 to 12 percentage points and raised 
the probability of unsubsidized employment by 7 to 9 
percentage points. 21
Because EOPP was so poorly designed to measure the ef 
fectiveness of job search assistance, Mathematica could not 
determine the fraction of the employment gain that was due 
solely to the job search plans tested. Nor were the researchers 
able to reliably measure the impact of EOPP on the other 
groups served—married women and men with dependent 
children. Mathematica could detect no impact of the pro 
gram on welfare dependency, a surprising finding in view of 
the population served by EOPP, which consisted over 
whelmingly of public assistance recipients. Because EOPP 
and its evaluation were terminated with unseemly haste in 
1981, we will never know whether the employment gains 
registered by EOPP participants were temporary or long- 
lasting. Nor can we ascertain whether welfare dependency 
was eventually affected by the program. Because of the
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limitations described above, Mathematica was unable to per 
form a benefit-cost analysis of the job search program alone, 
although the analysts did conclude that the EOPP project's 
overall social benefits probably exceeded its social costs. 
Based on our reading of the evidence, it appears that a 
modest and comparatively inexpensive program to help low- 
income breadwinners search for work may reduce spells of 
unemployment and raise the fraction of time spent working. 
Even though it is doubtful that this kind of help will change 
many workers' lives or radically change the nature of jobs 
they obtain, the help is nonetheless worthwhile, and it comes 
at relatively low cost.
Before concluding this discussion of EOPP, we should 
also note that some of the pilot sites tested variants of the 
basic self-directed job search model. One of the most in 
teresting variants was tested in Dayton, Ohio where wage- 
subsidy vouchers were distributed to a randomly selected 
subgroup of enrollees in the job search classes. The vouchers 
were simply certificates provided to participants to help them 
in their search for work. Participants were encouraged to 
alert potential employers of their vouchered status. If a 
vouchered job seeker was hired by a qualified employer, the 
employer could claim a subsidy for a fraction of the wages 
paid to the newly hired worker. The subsidy was payable 
either in the form of a tax credit or a direct check payment to 
the employer. It was worth up to $4,500 over a 2-year period.
In effect, the vouchered workers were "on sale." 
Employers, however, appeared to regard these workers as 
damaged goods. In comparison to unvouchered participants 
in the EOPP program, vouchered job seekers were 
significantly less likely to obtain employment during their 5- 
or 8-week job search period. Although this experiment is 
limited in many ways, and the research on it was discon 
tinued too early to be definitive, the findings are intriguing. 
The basic result appears to show that a targeted wage 
voucher may hurt rather than help a job seeker's chances of
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employment. It should thus come as no surprise that our na 
tion's two most important wage subsidy programs—the 
WIN and Targeted Jobs tax credits—are so little used. 
Because the stigma associated with these programs may 
outweigh their tax advantages to employers, the unemployed 
may be reluctant to use them and employers may be less like 
ly to hire job seekers who offer them.
A Moral and Some Lessons
Social experiments have primarily been tools of social 
scientists seeking guidance for effective policy reform or in 
novation, but their conclusions have often been very 
pessimistic for those wishing to change public policy. Ac 
cording to the Foreword of the New Jersey Income 
Maintenance Experiment final report, the decision to under 
take that experiment was based on the ". . . rapid spread of 
the belief, especially among economists, that negative in 
come taxation was an idea whose time had come." 22 After 
the New Jersey Experiment began, two Presidents—Nixon 
and Carter—proposed variants of a federal negative income 
tax, but in neither case was the cause of the proposal advanc 
ed by findings from the experiments. In fact, the high price 
tag of the proposed Carter plan, which certainly harmed its 
chances of enactment, was estimated using interim results 
from the Seattle-Denver experiment.
Because of the rigor with which experiments are designed 
and evaluated there may be a bias toward reaching 
pessimistic conclusions about policies that are experimental 
ly tested. The tested program is subject to critical examina 
tion of a type that is rarely imposed on existing programs. 
Such an examination is likely to reveal undesirable or even 
pernicious side-effects of a policy that might not otherwise 
be detected. Consider, for example, the earned income tax 
credit. Under this apparently benign provision of the tax 
code, refundable tax credits are provided to low-wage 
workers who have dependents. The purpose of the credit is
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to encourage work effort. If this policy were systematically 
evaluated using the methods applied to social experiments, 
the credit might be shown to reduce work effort or en 
courage family dissolution as the NIT was found to do. In 
deed, the credit increases work disincentives because it in 
creases marginal tax rates for more workers than are eligible 
for a subsidy on marginal work. If these effects were found 
to occur, and if they were widely publicized, the credit could 
be politically doomed. However, such effects are unlikely to 
be investigated because of the program's uncontroversial 
nature.
Numerous other examples could be mentioned. Do sub 
sidized student loans stimulate increases in education? If 
they do, is the added investment in education worth its social 
and private cost? Do business tax reductions and other state- 
local subsidy programs to attract new business achieve their 
goals? Such programs could conceivably reduce or delay 
local investment projects if businesses delayed their decisions 
as a result of their efforts to attract subsidy support.
If an experimentally tested program fails to achieve its in 
tended purpose, or if it has disagreeable consequences, those 
facts can be demonstrated with statistical rigor. Even more 
disturbing, if the program fails to achieve spectacular 
positive results, the degree to which it falls short of perfec 
tion can be measured precisely and then used as an argument 
against its implementation. If on the other hand an on-going 
program does not achieve its objectives or does harm, its 
failure may remain unsuspected, or at least unproved.
As an empirical fact, politically divisive policies are the 
ones most likely to be subject to rigorous experimenta 
tion—negative income taxation, housing vouchers for the 
poor, national health insurance, and labor market assistance 
to low-income workers. Programs aiding the able-bodied 
poor are among those with the weakest popular mandate, 
and hence their reform will nearly always inspire deep con-
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troversy. It is unclear whether experimentation per se can 
shed much light on the main points at issue—the demands of 
equity, the nature of a fair distribution, and the limit of 
society's obligation to help those who are at least partly able 
to help themselves. Our experience in the last fifteen years 
has taught us that large-scale social experiments can be relied 
on to teach us something of value about the policy in ques 
tion, but what we are taught can seldom be relied on to aid 
the cause of reforming or improving policy. Since society is 
not even-handed in subjecting programs for the poor and 
nonpoor to experimental investigation, we should not be sur 
prised that experimental scrutiny has been less than kind to 
programs for the poor. There is a moral here, and it is il 
lustrated in the three experiments we have considered: if you 
advocate a particular policy reform or innovation, do not 
press to have it tested.
Beyond this political economy moral, are there lessons for 
research or evaluation that can be gleaned from the ex 
periments? One such lesson concerns the costs and benefits 
of large-scale social experimentation relative to nonex- 
perimental social research. Clearly, the research costs of 
social experimentation are enormous. For the three ex 
periments reviewed here, the costs of program administra 
tion (including experimental transfers, stipends, and wages) 
and evaluation exceeded $200 million. The potential benefits 
in terms of additions to knowledge may also be substantial, 
especially when it is recognized that obtaining reliable infor 
mation about human behavior is usually a slow process. 
However, if the opportunity cost of any proposed experi 
ment is a reduction in nonexperimental research costing the 
same amount of money, the expected findings would have to 
be extremely valuable for the benefits of an experiment to ex 
ceed its cost. Of course, this conclusion is weaker if the op 
portunity cost of the resources used for experimentation is 
low. This would be the case, for example, for resources that 
are diverted from some activity with low social value.
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In view of the high cost of experiments, it is appropriate to 
subject proposals for future experiments to a test that in 
cludes the following questions:
1. Have adequate models of the behavior which the ex 
perimental treatment is designed to affect been 
developed and tested on existing bodies of data?
2. Can the experiment and its evaluation meet high stan 
dards of basic research? That is, can problems of time 
horizon, contamination, Hawthorne effects, replicabili- 
ty, and extrapolation of results to a national program be 
handled adequately in the experimental design or in the 
evaluation of experimental results?
3. Can the experiment provide evidence about a social 
policy that cannot be obtained using less expensive, 
nonexperimental methods? Alternatively, can the ex 
periment provide findings that are sufficiently more 
reliable or statistically precise to justify the added cost 
of the research?
4. How important are the potential research findings 
about experimental outcomes? Are they crucial in deter 
mining whether the tested treatment is a good or bad 
policy?
5. Can the experiment permit tests and evaluation of the 
operational feasibility of social policy measures and 
yield evidence on the effectiveness of alternative ad 
ministrative arrangements of such programs?
6. Can the experimental findings be validly generalized to 
infer the consequences of policies not specifically tested 
in the experiment?
The number of potential social experiments that can pass 
the test implied by these questions is not likely to be large. 
This conclusion is strengthened by our review of the findings 
of the three experiments. While the evidence on behavioral
130 Three Labor Market Experiments
responses is more reliable than is likely to be obtained from 
nonexperimental research, its value, in terms of added 
knowledge per dollar of cost, was not uniquely high except in 
the case of the tested NIT plans. For the training and 
employment experiments, including the one run as part of 
the Seattle-Denver experiment, the programs tested were so 
specific in nature that it is difficult to extrapolate the find 
ings except to other programs that are run exactly as they 
were. (For EOPP, even this may be impossible because the 
tested treatments are essentially nonreplicable.)
The NIT experiment was more valuable for two reasons. 
Its findings were considerably more reliable and statistically 
precise than any that had been obtained in the preceding 10 
years of nonexperimental research. Moreover, its findings 
are useful in evaluating tax and welfare policies in addition 
to those actually tested in Seattle-Denver, in part because 
there is a well-developed theory for assessing labor supply 
responses to tax rates and guarantees.
But the exception represented by the Seattle-Denver ex 
periment is rare. Many conceivable experiments in the field 
of employment and training must concentrate on testing 
"black box" treatments. Supported Work and the job club 
model tested in EOPP both represent this kind of treatment. 
There is no well-established theory, as existed in the case of 
the NIT experiments, that permits us to predict whether and 
how these particular approaches will affect participants. Nor 
can we predict from experimental findings the effect of 
similar—but not identical—policy options. This lack of 
knowledge regarding the process by which treatment affects 
performance limits the applicability of the findings. In the 
case of both Supported Work and EOPP, the treatment 
tested was of little interest by the time the research was com 
pleted, and the findings, in turn, were of limited value in 
assessing policy options then being considered.
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Black box experiments can be valuable in employment and 
training research if they are relatively inexpensive but 
rigorous and if there is systematic variation in the treatments 
which are tested. Investing large sums of money to test a 
single approach is likely to be a serious error except under 
very unusual conditions. To justify its high cost, a social ex 
periment must offer the prospect of valuable additions to 
knowledge about human behavior. In light of the moral 
mentioned above, the benefits of an experiment will seldom 
include basic reforms to policy.
NOTES
1. A very small number of families were enrolled in experimental plans 
lasting up to 20 years.
2. Office of Income Security Policy, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Overview of the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance 
Experiment Final Report, Government Printing Office, Washington, 
DC, 1983, pp. 13-16. The higher estimate of the impact on women 
heading single-parent families is based on the responses of women in the 
5-year group during the fourth and fifth experimental years. Remaining 
estimates are based on reported responses of enrollees in both the 3- and 
5-year groups during the second and third experimental years.
3. Ibid., p. 6.
4. See Henry Aaron and John Todd, "The Use of Income Maintenance 
Experiment Findings in Public Policy, 1977-78." Industrial Relations 
Research Association Proceedings, 1979, pp. 46-56.
5. Implementing a NIT program for single-parent families, given the 
combination of existing transfer programs, is difficult. Because of the 
widely varying AFDC benefit levels across states, it is difficult to select a 
NIT guarantee level that is low enough to be affordable, but high enough 
so that only a small fraction of families in the high-benefit states receive 
a NIT payment that is no lower than their current benefit. A national 
NIT plan with a guarantee equal to three-quarters of the poverty line 
would increase labor supply among single mothers, not because of the 
work incentive embodied in a low tax rate, but because transfer benefits 
would be slashed for so many mothers in states currently paying high 
benefits.
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6. This result as well as those reported in the preceding paragraph are 
from Philip K. Robins and Richard W. West, "Labor Supply 
Response," in Final Report of the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance 
Experiment, vol. I, Design and Results, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, Government Printing Office, pp. 180-87.
7. Strictly speaking, the experiment provided no evidence about the im 
pact of raising marginal tax rates to 100 percent. Within the range of tax 
rates tested in the experiment, however, higher tax rates appear to be 
associated with higher aggregate labor supply. See Ibid., p. 182.
8. Assignments to the employment-training programs were conducted in 
such a way that analysts were able to reliably distinguish the separate im 
pacts of those programs and the tested NIT plans.
9. Reimbursable (or direct) expenses included costs for tuition, books, 
transportation, and child care.
10. Note that this was the impact on program eligibles; the impact on 
program participants was of course much greater. The 50 percent subsidy 
also encouraged some extra schooling, but the increases were smaller. 
See Bureau of Social Science Research, Vouchering Manpower Services: 
Past Experiences and Their Implications for Future Programs, Bureau of 
Social Science Research report to the National Commission on Employ 
ment Policy, Washington, DC, 1982, p. 20.
11. Ibid., p. 29.
12. This quote as well as much of the material for this section is drawn 
from Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, Summary and 
the Findings of the National Supported Work Demonstration, Ballinger 
Publishing Co., Cambridge, MA, 1980.
13. Mathematica Policy Research, Final Report: Employment Oppor 
tunity Pilot Project: Analysis of Program Impacts, MPR, Princeton, 
NJ, p. 1.
14. Ibid., p. 20.
15. Ibid., p. 22.
16. Ibid., pp. 27, 105 and 116.
17. We should emphasize that the low participation of welfare recipients 
in the demonstration was partly attributable to poor enforcement of job 
search requirements in local welfare departments. If the job search/PSE 
jobs and welfare programs were more tightly coordinated, the costs and 
hence potential benefits of an EOPP-type program might have been 
greater.
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18. Mathematica Policy Research, Final Report, p. 22. Many mandatory 
participants in WIN are in fact required to participate in an activity like 
EOPP as a condition for continued receipt of welfare benefits.
19. Ibid., p. 22.
20. Ibid., p. 108.
21. Ibid., p. 3. A small percentage of enrollees obtained employment in 
EOPP's own jobs program. For that reason the gains in unsubsidized 
employment were smaller than those in all forms of employment.
22. David Kershaw and Jerilyn Fair, The New Jersey Income 
Maintenance Experiment, Volume I, Operations, Surveys, and Ad 
ministration, Academic Press, New York, 1976, p. xi.
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